0000000000005063
AUTHOR
Håvard Løkke
showing 7 related works from this author
Knowledge and Mistakes
2015
This chapter is about how we attain knowledge, and how we fail to do so. I argue that a true thought counts as a piece of knowledge if and only if it has the right sort of causal history. I also argue that these so-called cognitive thoughts are the criteria of truth in the sense that they are guaranteed to be true and able to guarantee the truth of that which can be inferred from them. So I argue that there are three kinds of knowledge, namely the information conveyed by our senses, the information contained in our preconceptions and the conclusions that can be inferred from our sense-perceptions and our preconceptions. I then argue that we fail to attain knowledge if we assent to a thought…
Nurtured by Nature
2015
This chapter is about the metaphysical and psychological assumptions underlying early Stoic epistemology. I show that, according to the Stoics, each thing is qualified by nature in such a way as to be both a kind of thing and a unique thing. I also show that the mind of a human adult is qualified by nature in such a way as to be able to form thoughts about all sorts of qualified things, as long as it has acquired notions about them. I then detail how notions are acquired, i.e. how nature operates in such a way that human beings first receive all sorts of information through the senses and then retain some of this information, so that we acquire the ability to recognize things in our environ…
Choice and Practical Reasoning in Ancient Philosophy
2013
Ancient thinkers acknowledged that we are the sort of creatures that want things to be a certain way and can make efforts for them to become that way. In that sense, the ancients had a notion of volition. But it is not clear how they conceived of volition. The problem is partly historical. Some late ancient, notably Christian thinkers came to regard volition in a different way than earlier thinkers had done, seeing reason as a less powerful ability than Socrates did, and instead placing their hopes on the will, which they regarded as a separate and sovereign part of the soul. About these historical developments there is much debate and little agreement. The problem is also partly conceptual…
Our Thoughts and Their Objects
2015
This chapter is about how we as adults use language to represent these qualified things. I first show that the objects of our true thoughts are what Chrysippus called obtaining propositions, which is what we now call facts. Then I look at four kinds of thought and the kinds of fact they represent. I start with two kinds of thought that are unique in that they are guaranteed to be true, according to Chrysippus, namely sense perceptions and preconceptions. I argue that sense perceptions represent so-called simple facts and that all conceptions represent the sort of non-simple facts that can be captured in conditionals. I then look at two kinds of thought that are indispensable when we engage …
Our Progress Towards Virtue
2015
This chapter is about how we can improve our rational abilities, i.e. make progress towards virtue. I first show that, according to Chrysippus, the natural properties of children are usually corrupted in three ways when they grow up and that adults therefore can make progress only by solving their inner conflicts, becoming more steadfast in their practical reasoning, and improving their self-understanding. So I argue that the main remedy against corruption is to study philosophy. I detail how we can acquire a better self-understanding by studying physics and how we can cure the mind of its inconsistencies by studying logic. I also argue that ethics prepares the mind for an active life in wh…
From Carneades to Cicero
2015
This chapter is about how Stoic epistemology developed in the two centuries after Chrysippus’ death. I first show that, as a result of Carneades’ critique in the mid-second century, there was a shift of emphasis in the epistemological debate between the Stoa and the Academy. From then on the task was not to explain what causal features a cognitive thought has, but to describe what phenomenological features it has. I show that the later Stoics responded to this challenge in two different ways. Some changed Chrysippus’ theory quite radically. They held that a cognitive thought is characterized by giving rise to a sense of conviction, denied that preconceptions count as cognitive thoughts, and…
From Zeno to Chrysippus
2015
This chapter is about the origin and development of early Stoic epistemology. I discuss how Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoa, was influenced by his predecessors and interpreted by his successors. I argue that Stoicism rely on two basic assumptions for which Socrates is the main predecessor, namely that human beings are at home in the world and that it is only by using our rational abilities to detect salient truths and organize them into skills that we can successfully orient ourselves in this world. This Socratic-Stoic position relies on a naturalistic theory of concept acquisition, for which Aristotle is the main predecessor, or so I argue. I then look at how Zeno’s original episte…