0000000000033828

AUTHOR

Anna Pietryga

showing 4 related works from this author

Paraconsistent logics, conventionalism and ontology

2004

Paraconsistent logics may be viewed as one of the last elements in a series of rapid developments in science in the 19th and early 20th c., triggered by the appearance of non-Euclidean geometries. The philosophy of conventionalism, which gave a metatheoretical framework to the basic changes involved, may also help in evaluating the truth import of (paraconsistent) logic and in determining its relation to ontology.

PhilosophyConventionalismSeries (mathematics)Relation (database)business.industryParaconsistent logicArtificial intelligenceOntology (information science)businessPrinciple of explosionEpistemologyMathematicsLogic and Logical Philosophy
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Two kinds of unexpected problems in writings on logic

2006

In some texts concerning logic the reader faces unexpected problems, namely: 1) incongruities between the commentary and logical solutions offered and 2) mistakes concerning external facts.

PhilosophyEpistemologyMathematicsLogic and Logical Philosophy
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Semantically Closed Languages Reconsidered. Re-Reading Alfred Tarski

2019

The text shows that Alfred Tarski studied semantics to define a true sentence in a m a t e r i a l l y a d e q u a t e and f o r m a l l y c o r r e c t way, and in effect he defined the co-called semantically closed languages as a subset of formalized ones, in which the occurrence of the Liar paradox is imminent because of the features of the language used. This is one of the points of Tarski’s heritage where misunderstandings constantly occur among the readers of Tarski‘s work, and that is why the present paper may prove to be useful by presenting suitable excerpts from the original Tarski’s text. Tarski found additional limiting criteria applicable to formalised languages, which may prev…

paradoxtruthReading (process)media_common.quotation_subjectPhilosophyformally correctGeneral Medicinematerially adequateself-referentialsemanticsLinguisticsmedia_commonArchiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej
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Tarski’s t-scheme as an alleged basis of Montague semantics

2007

My point in this paper is to focus on some details of Alfred Tarski’s writing that in my opinion have not been aptly represented — or aptly rejected — in Richard Montague’s grammar and to agree with those who share Tarski’s view that human language is something uncapturable. The paper consists of two parts, concerning 1) some attempts to formalize the non-declarative utterances, and 2) the limitations of T-scheme and of Montague grammar.

Scheme (programming language)Grammarmedia_common.quotation_subjectHuman languageMontague grammarBasis (universal algebra)SemanticsLinguisticsEpistemologyFocus (linguistics)PhilosophycomputerNatural languagemedia_commoncomputer.programming_languageMathematicsLogic and Logical Philosophy
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