0000000000082136
AUTHOR
Cristina Fuentes-albero
Can the International Environmental Cooperation Be Bought?
In this paper a two-stage game of international environmental agreement formation with asymmetric countries is solved. The equilibrium of the game allows to determine the number of countries interested in signing the agreement. Two cases are studied. In the first case, it is assumed that the only difference among countries is given by the abatement costs, and in the second case, by the environmental damages. In both cases, two different institutional settings, one without side payments and another with side payments, are considered. The results establish that the asymmetry assumption has no important effects on the scope of cooperation in comparison with the symmetric case if side payments …
Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
In this paper a two-stage game of international environmental agreement formation with asymmetric countries is analytically solved. The equilibrium of the game makes it possible to determine the size and composition of a stable agreement. Two cases are studied. In the first case, countries differ only in abatement costs, while in the second case, they differ in environmental damages. In both cases, two different institutional settings, one without transfers and another with transfers, are considered. The results establish that the asymmetry assumption has no important effects on the scope of cooperation in comparison with the symmetric case if transfers are not used or abatement costs repre…
Households' Balance Sheets and the Effect of Fiscal Policy
Using households' balance-sheet composition in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, we identify six household types. Since 1999, there has been a decline in the share of patient households and an increase in the share of impatient households with negative wealth. Using a six-agent New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions, we explore how changes in households' shares affect the transmission of government spending shocks. We show that the relative share of households in the left tail of the wealth distribution plays a key role in the aggregate marginal propensity to consume, the magnitude of fiscal multipliers, and the distributional consequences of government spending shocks. W…