0000000000172086

AUTHOR

Mehdi Nekhili

showing 4 related works from this author

Free Cash Flow and the Governance of French Firms (Free Cash Flow Et Gouvernance Des Entreprises Françaises)

2008

The limitation of the problem of free cash flow depends on the efficiency of governance mechanisms. In our study, we chose four main governance mechanisms, namely debt, the distribution of dividends, boards of directors and ownership structure. On the basis of a sample of 94 French firms in 2004, the results show that sustained distribution of dividends, a small-sized board of directors and some level of share-ownership by board members and managers are necessary conditions to the resolution of free cash flow. External directors and controlling interests act on free cash flow risk rather indirectly by favouring a massive distribution of dividends. The CEO/chairman duality produces the oppos…

ChoseEconomyFree cash flowCorporate governanceWelfare economicsDividendSociologySSRN Electronic Journal
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Headquarters’ Control Capacity and the Choice of R&D Organizational Forms Abroad

2013

International audience; Recently, regarding globalization, the decentralization of R&D activities abroad by multinational companies (MNCs) has become important in developed countries. However, academic research has not given this topic sufficient attention. This paper explains how the efficiency of control and incentive mechanisms may affect the choice of organizational forms by MNCs that decentralize their R&D activities abroad. We identify five main organizational forms: wholly owned green-field subsidiary, wholly owned acquired subsidiary, joint venture, cross-licensing agreements, and unilateral licensing agreements. A questionnaire addressed to the R&D managers of American and European…

Multinational Companies[SHS.GESTION.STRAT-POL] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.strat-pol[ SHS.GESTION.COMPTA ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.comptaR&DJEL : M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration/M.M1.M16 - International Business Administration[SHS.GESTION.COMPTA] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.compta[SHS.GESTION.STRAT-POL]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.strat-polJEL: F - International Economics/F.F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business/F.F2.F23 - Multinational Firms • International BusinessJEL: O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D[SHS.GESTION.COMPTA]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.comptajel:F23Foreign Investmentsjel:L22Organizational FormsJEL : O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&DR&D;foreign investments;multinational companies;control mechanisms;organizational Forms.JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration/M.M1.M16 - International Business AdministrationJEL : F - International Economics/F.F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business/F.F2.F23 - Multinational Firms • International BusinessControl MechanismsJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives Organization and Behavior/L.L2.L24 - Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology LicensingJEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives Organization and Behavior/L.L2.L24 - Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
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Gouvernance contractuelle et cognitive des alliances internationales en R&D

2009

Notre objectif est d’expliquer le choix des firmes multinationales entre les alliances avec prise de participation et les alliances sans prise de participation pour investir en R&D à l’étranger. Les déterminants du choix peuvent être contractuels ou cognitifs. Nos résultats montrent que les alliances sans prise de participation sont choisies en cas d’une spécificité des actifs et de fréquence moyennes ou faibles des transactions et au cas où les firmes parentes détiennent des capacités en R&D similaires. Nos résultats montrent aussi que les firmes multinationales n’optent pas nécessairement pour les alliances à fort degré d’interdépendance organisationnelle dans un objectif d’exploration de…

jel:L22R&D;alliances;théorie des coûts de transaction;théories cognitives;alliances;transaction costs theory;Knowledge based view.jel:F23
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Gouvernance contractuelle et cognitive des alliances internationales en R&D par les firmes multinationales

2010

[SHS.GESTION.STRAT-POL] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.strat-pol[ SHS.GESTION.STRAT-POL ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.strat-pol[SHS.GESTION.STRAT-POL]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration/domain_shs.gestion.strat-pol
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