0000000000210313

AUTHOR

Stefan P. Penczynski

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Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication

2020

Abstract Two alternative modes of reasoning in coordination games are prominently discussed in the literature: level-k thinking and team reasoning. In order to differentiate between the two modes of reasoning, we experimentally investigate payoff-asymmetric coordination games using an intra-group communication design that incentivizes subjects to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. We find that the reasoning process is significantly different between games. In payoff-symmetric games, team reasoning plays an important role for coordination. In payoff-asymmetric games, level-k reasoning results in frequent miscoordination. Our study clearly illustrates how small differences between …

Communication designOrganizational Behavior and Human Resource ManagementEconomics and EconometricsProcess (engineering)Computer scienceOrder (business)Human–computer interaction0502 economics and business05 social sciencesCommunication in small groups050206 economic theoryCoordination game050207 economicsJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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