0000000000382910
AUTHOR
Bruno Broseta
showing 2 related works from this author
Asset Markets and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study
2001
This paper reports the experimental results of implicit pre-play communication on the equilibrium selection in threshold public goods game experiments. The existence of an asset market in which the right to participate in a public goods game with a provision point is auctioned off among a larger group in a first stage is found to enhance significantly the contribution to the provision of the public good in a subsequent second stage. Though, contributions declined on average in the repeated public goods game when subjects were endowed with the right to play, they increased when subjects purchased the right to play. Once reached the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the second stage, the auction…
ASSET MARKETS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH PROVISION POINTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
2001
We report experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and individual behavior. Auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players strikingly enhances public good provision. Once public good provision is obtained, the auction price at the preliminary stage increases to its upper limit, dissipating all players’ gains associated with the provision of the public good. Individual deviations from the equilibrium strategy are neither able to force lower market prices nor to affect provision of the public good in subsequent periods. (JEL C72, C92, H41) I. INTRODUCTION Public good pro…