0000000000391310
AUTHOR
Juan Bautista Cabota
Do editors have a silver bullet? an agent-based model of peer review
This paper presents an agent-based model of peer review that looks at the effect of different editorial policies of referee selection. We tested four author/referee matching scenarios as follows: random selection of referees, selection of referees with a similar status to submission authors, selection of higher-skilled and lower skilled referees. We tested these scenarios against three types of referee behaviour, i.e., fair, unreliable and strategic and measured their implications for the quality and efficiency of the process. Results show that in case of randomness of referee judgment, any editorial policy is detrimental for peer review. If referees behave strategically, certain matching p…
When Competition Is Pushed Too Hard. An Agent-Based Model Of Strategic Behaviour Of Referees In Peer Review
This paper examines the impact of strategic behaviour of referees on the quality and efficiency of peer review. We modelled peer review as a process based on knowledge asymmetry and subject to evaluation bias. We built two simulation scenarios to investigate largescale implications of referee behaviour and judgment bias. The first one was inspired by “the luck of the reviewer draw” idea. In this case, we assumed that referees randomly fell into Type I and Type II errors, i.e., recommending submissions of low quality to be published or recommending against the publishing of submissions which should have been published. In the second scenario, we assumed that certain referees tried intentiona…