0000000000431305

AUTHOR

Marie Obidzinski

showing 2 related works from this author

Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence

2018

This paper deals with the presumption of innocence and the law enforcer's incentives to exert investigative effort. Our main result is that, even if the presumption of guilt maximizes deterrence for a given effort by the law enforcer, divergent objectives between the law enforcer (who maximizes the probability of a conviction weighted by the magnitude of the sanction and the type of the citizen) and the public decision-maker (who minimizes social costs) may lead the latter to prefer the presumption of innocence. Indeed, the presumption of innocence may induce the law enforcer to increase investigative efforts thereby improving deterrence. As a consequence, if the law enforcer's effort is re…

Balance (metaphysics)Economics and Econometrics050208 financePresumption of innocencePresumption05 social sciencesCriminal procedure[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance16. Peace & justice0506 political scienceHarmIncentiveDeterrence (psychology)0502 economics and business050602 political science & public administrationEconomicsConvictionDeterrence (legal)050207 economics[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceLaw and economicsSSRN Electronic Journal
researchProduct

Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error

2020

We study the interactions between accuracy and standards used in the determination of legal liability. First, we show that accuracy and type-1 errors (wrongful findings of liability) must reduce each other's effectiveness in mitigating optimal type-2 errors (wrongful failures to assign liability) for previous results in the literature to hold. When this condition holds, for major crimes the median voter's tolerance for type-1 errors is reduced as the legal system's accuracy increases. However, this relationship need not hold for minor offenses. Our analysis also reveals that legal processes that emerge under electoral pressures convict more often than is optimal but less often than necessar…

Legal liabilitymedia_common.quotation_subjectLiabilityEconomicsDeterrence (legal)ConvictWelfaremedia_commonLaw and economicsSSRN Electronic Journal
researchProduct