Varieties of Presence

2015

Perceptual presence without counterfactual richness

2014

In this commentary, I suggest that non-visual perceptual modalities provide counterexamples to Seth's claim that perceptual presence depends on counterfactual richness. Then I suggest a modification to Seth's view that is not vulnerable to these counterexamples.

Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science

2012

In the target article, Andy Clark addresses the question of how a probabilistic predictive coding model of the mind relates to our personal level mental lives. This question, he suggests, is “potentially the most important” (MS46). The question is important indeed, but Clark’s answer fails to capitalize on another possible advantage of this approach. Clark suggests that there is a disconnect between the way the world appears to us, on one hand, and the way that it is represented in the brain, on the other. He deals with this disconnect by limiting the scope of the theory, by pointing out that he is discussing a theory of how brains encode and process information, not a theory about how thin…

Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical ConductRecommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology

2016

The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that one’s environment can influence one’s psychological states, as well as recent work on inducing illusions of embodiment. Then, in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect,” we go …