0000000000555769
AUTHOR
José Martínez Fernández
showing 4 related works from this author
The Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Problem and the Theory of Clones of Functions
2003
This paper presents the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point problem: to characterize the truth-functional schemes of the first-order logic such that, for every interpreted language L, a truth predicate for L can be defined in L using a Kripkean fixed-point. A propositional version of the problem is defined using the stipulation logic of A. Visser and then the strategy adopted for the solution to the three-valued case is presented, using the theory of clones of functions.
A FailedCassatio: Goldstein on the Liar
2009
The purpose of this note is to express some doubts about Goldstein's cassationist solution to the Liar Paradox. After sketching his theory (§I), we argue that the notions he introduces in order to solve the Strengthened Liar give rise to paradoxes the theory cannot deal with (§II).
Eliminating self-reference from Grelling's and Zwicker's paradoxes
2014
El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer versiones de las paradojas de Grelling (sobre el predicado"heterológico") y de Zwicker (sobre el hiperjuego) inspiradas en la paradoja de Yablo. Nuestras versiones de estas paradojas no parecen involucrar ni autorreferencia ni circularidad viciosa. The goal of this paper is to present Yabloesque versions of Grelling¿s and Zwicker¿s paradoxes concerning the notions of ¿heterological¿ and ¿hypergame¿ respectively. We will offer counterparts of these paradoxes that do not seem to involve self-reference or vicious circularity.
El concepto de lenguaje universal
2005
The aim of the paper is to differentiate three different notions of universality (ontologic, semantic and weak universality) and to discuss some well-known results that show that there exist no universal languages, due to the semantical paradoxes.