0000000000590024
AUTHOR
Cristina De Fuentes Barberá
Disciplinary Sanctions and Audit Quality: Empirical Evidence from an External Oversight System
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of disciplinary sanctions on audit quality, based on the external oversight system set up in Spain in the early nineties. Specifically, we examine the effects of the sanctions imposed by the Institute of Accounting and Auditing (ICAC), a government regulatory agency independent from the auditing industry. To proxy for audit quality, two client-specific earnings quality indicators are considered; i.e. the likelihood of loss reporting and abnormal accruals. According to our results, the Spanish external oversight system does not penalise isolated but structural audit malpractice, since sanctioned auditors exhibit lower average audit quality…
The Stock Market Reaction to the Enron-Andersen Affair in Spain
2Universidad Jaume I de Castellon This paper investigates whether listed Spanish companies audited by Andersen have suffered any negative economic impact due to the scandal surrounding Andersen’s work in Enron Corporation. To that end, we have measured the economic consequences, if any, of Andersen’s loss of reputation by examining the reaction in terms of movements in the stock prices of its client companies using an event study methodology. We have analysed abnormal returns on the stock prices of all firms listed in the Spanish Interconnected Market around two event dates: the date of Andersen’s public admission that it had destroyed significant financial documents related to Enron Corp. …