0000000000715659

AUTHOR

Karl Friston

showing 2 related works from this author

The Active Inference Approach to Ecological Perception: General Information Dynamics for Natural and Artificial Embodied Cognition

2018

The emerging neurocomputational vision of humans as embodied, ecologically embedded, social agents – who shape and are shaped by their environment – offers a golden opportunity to revisit and revise ideas about the physical and information-theoretic underpinnings of life, mind, and consciousness itself. In particular, the active inference framework (AIF) makes it possible to bridge connections from computational neuroscience and robotics/AI to ecological psychology and phenomenology, revealing common underpinnings and overcoming key limitations. AIF opposes the mechanistic to the reductive, while staying fully grounded in a naturalistic and information theoretic foundation, using the princi…

0301 basic medicineComputer sciencemedia_common.quotation_subjectlcsh:Mechanical engineering and machineryaffordancesInferencelcsh:QA75.5-76.9503 medical and health sciences0302 clinical medicineArtificial IntelligencePerceptionHypothesis and TheoryEcological psychologyevolutionlcsh:TJ1-1570AffordanceuncertaintyFrame problemmedia_commonembodimentSelf-organizationCognitive scienceRobotics and AIfree energyself-organizationframe problemComputer Science Applications030104 developmental biologyEmbodied cognitionlcsh:Electronic computers. Computer scienceConsciousnessskilled expertiseB1030217 neurology & neurosurgeryFrontiers in Robotics and AI
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‘Seeing the Dark’: Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference

2018

One of the central claims of the Self-model Theory of Subjectivity is that the experience of being someone - even in a minimal form - arises through a transparent phenomenal self-model, which itself can in principle be reduced to brain processes. Here, we consider whether it is possible to distinguish between phenomenally transparent and opaque states in terms of active inference. We propose a relationship of phenomenal opacity to expected uncertainty or precision; i.e., the capacity for introspective attention and implicit mental action. Thus we associate introspective attention with the deployment of 'precision' that may render the perceptual evidence (for action) opaque, while treating t…

transparencyself-modellcsh:Psychologyactive inferenceHypothesis and Theorylcsh:BF1-990Psychologyopacitymental actionGeneral PsychologyattentionFrontiers in Psychology
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