0000000000824515
AUTHOR
Hounwanou Degnide Didier
showing 3 related works from this author
Impact of Risk Aversion on Bidder's Optimal Strategy in Takeover Contests
2008
We consider a takeover setting in which bidders are risk averse and study aversion's consequences on their strategy. We found that when bidders are risk averse, under some conditions, their overbidding depends on the size of toeholds they hold. We show that there is a threshold under that a bidder doesn't overbid into the takeover process and becomes aggressive above that treshold. However, if the overbidding increases in toeholds size, it decreases in valuation. Without toeholds, takeovers's results are similar if bidders are averse or neutral risk.
Multiple Motivations Consequences on Bidder's Optimal Strategy in Takeover Contests
2011
This paper examines the optimal bidding strategy in takeover contests for a target firm, and the positive correlation between the bidders’ valuation. We consider risk neutral bidders who compete for the control of a target firm in which they get initial shareholdings. The bidder valuation for target firm is correlated with his motivations which determine the bidder’s strategy. We study bidder’s optimal strategy in mixed motivations setting. Since motivations are numerous, hypothesis of affiliated value in auctions allows to study bidder’s strategy. The paper shows that the impact of affiliation degree on bidder’s optimal strategy depends on their private signal and on the ratio between thei…
Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests
2010
We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders incur private costs to participate to the auction. Supposing that valuations for target firm are common knowledge, we study the optimal strategy of bidders and analyze the takeover result when they get or not toeholds in the target firm. We found that bidder's decision of participation is endogenous. By analyzing bidder's condition of participation, we found that the probability that the potential bidder with the highest valuation will not participate to the control, exists. We show that this probability increases with the size of toeholds possessed by the bidder with low valuation. Nevertheless, the size of toeholds possessed by the bidd…