0000000000895454

AUTHOR

Marc Labie

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Discrimination by microcredit officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda

2015

This paper studies the relationship between a microfinance institution (MFI) and its loan officers when officers discriminate against a particular group of micro-entrepreneurs. Using survey data from Uganda, we provide evidence that loan officers are more biased than other employees against disabled micro-entrepreneurs. In line with the evidence, we build an agency model of a non-profit MFI and a biased loan officer in charge of granting loans. Since incentive schemes are costly and the MFI's budget is limited, the MFI faces a trade-off between combating discrimination and granting loans. We show that the optimal incentive premium is a non-decreasing function of the MFI's budget. Moreover, …

Economics and EconometricsMinority groupmedia_common.quotation_subjectLoan officerAccountingMicrofinance; Discrimination; Credit Officers; Incentives.jel:G21law.inventionOfficerlawAgency (sociology)InstitutionEconomicsNon-conforming loanmedia_commonFinanceMicrofinancebusiness.industryCompensation (psychology)jel:J33IncentiveLoanSurvey data collectionjel:O16businessFinanceThe Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
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