The embodied self, the pattern theory of self, and the predictive mind

2018

Do we have to presuppose a self to account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should we characterize the self? These questions are discussed in the context of two alternatives, i.e., the no-self position held by \(\textit {Metzinger (2003, 2009)}\) and the claim that the only self we have to presuppose is a narrative self \(\textit {(Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 2007; Hardcastle, 2008)}\) which is primarily an abstract entity. In contrast to these theories, I argue that we have to presuppose an embodied self, although this is not a metaphysical substance, nor an entity for which stable necessary and jointly sufficient conditions can be given. Self-consciousness results from an integrati…

A multiplicity view for social cognition : defending a coherent framework ; a reply to Lisa Quadt

2015