Reseña de Relative Truth. M. García-Carpintero, M. Kölbel (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 [Ressenya]

2009

Recientemente diversos autores (Kölbel, Lasersohn, MacFarlane o Richard) han defendido la conveniencia de adoptar semánticas relativistas para un sinfín de oraciones del lenguaje natural, oraciones que empleamos, por ejemplo, para expresar futuros contingentes:"Mañana habrá una batalla naval"; modalidades epistémicas:"Puede que llueva"; atribuciones de conocimiento:"Ana sabe que hoy es jueves"; u opiniones acerca de cuestiones morales, estéticas, de gusto o de humor:"x es bueno (hermoso/divertido/etc.)". También se han propuesto semánticas de este tipo para oraciones con términos vagos, en especial, adjetivos como"alto","rico","verde" o"prudente" que nos remiten a propiedades que algo puede…

A FailedCassatio: Goldstein on the Liar

2009

The purpose of this note is to express some doubts about Goldstein's cassationist solution to the Liar Paradox. After sketching his theory (§I), we argue that the notions he introduces in order to solve the Strengthened Liar give rise to paradoxes the theory cannot deal with (§II).

Les paradoxes i la filosofia: tres visions contemporànies

2015

Habitualment les paradoxes són caracteritzades com a enunciats aparentment falsos recolzats per arguments aparentment bons que parteixen de premisses que la majoria de la gent consideraria trivialment vertaderes. Aquest article ofereix una visió panoràmica de tres perspectives contemporànies de les paradoxes. Segons la concepció epistèmica, les paradoxes juguen un paper crucial en el desenvolupament de la ciència i mai no constitueixen proves correctes d’enunciats falsos. D’acord amb la concepció dialetheista, la conclusió d’alguns raonaments paradoxals és alhora vertadera i falsa, havent-hi, per tant, algunes contradiccions vertaderes (i falses). Finalment, la concepció mística entén les p…

Saving Truth from Paradox

2010

Singular Terms in Fiction. Fictional and “Real” Names (III Blasco Disputatio)

2019

Abstract In this introduction, I consider different problems posed by the use of singular terms in fiction (section 1), paying especial attention to proper names and, in particular, to names of real people, places, etc. As we will see (section 2), descriptivist and Millian theories of reference face different kinds of problems in explaining the use of fictional names in fiction-related contexts. Moreover, the task of advancing a uniform account of names in these contexts—an account which deals not only with fictional names but also with “real” names—will prove to be very hard no matter whether we favour realist or antirealist intuitions about fictional discourse (section 3). Section 4 offer…

Empiricism and Experience: Two Problems

2009

In his attempt to answer a fundamental question: ‘What is the contribution of experience to knowledge?’ (E & E, pp. vii, 3, 11, etc.), 1 Anil Gupta wants to offer an account of knowledge and experi...

Eliminating self-reference from Grelling's and Zwicker's paradoxes

2014

El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer versiones de las paradojas de Grelling (sobre el predicado"heterológico") y de Zwicker (sobre el hiperjuego) inspiradas en la paradoja de Yablo. Nuestras versiones de estas paradojas no parecen involucrar ni autorreferencia ni circularidad viciosa. The goal of this paper is to present Yabloesque versions of Grelling¿s and Zwicker¿s paradoxes concerning the notions of ¿heterological¿ and ¿hypergame¿ respectively. We will offer counterparts of these paradoxes that do not seem to involve self-reference or vicious circularity.

Contradicciones de inclusión : la estructura de las paradojas reflexivas y el problema de su solucion

2005

Review of Saving Truth from Paradox, by Hartry Field. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 403 pp. [Ressenya]

2010

Let me say, to finish this review, that the achievements of Field"s book are undeniable. He offers a paracomplete logic that preserves the principles and features that enable us to use the truth predicate as a logical device of quantification over sentences. His logic, moreover, validates an impressively high number of classical principles and contains an operator that can be used to characterize paradoxical sentences without at least apparently falling prey of new paradoxes. That is, doubtless, a remarkable feat and the use Field makes of fixed point constructions and revision rules, together with his discussion of well-known solutions to the Liar Paradox constitute a major contribution to…