6533b7d3fe1ef96bd126120e
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?
Pablo Rychtersubject
PhilosophyRisk analysis (engineering)media_common.quotation_subject060302 philosophy05 social sciencesFree will0501 psychology and cognitive sciences06 humanities and the arts0603 philosophy ethics and religionPsychology050105 experimental psychologymedia_commondescription
Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017-10-26 | Disputatio |