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RESEARCH PRODUCT

The question of the subject of sentiments in Descartes' dualism

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The goal of this thesis is to address the question of what would be the subject of the predicates that denote sentiments in Descartes’ writings. The proposed hypothesis is that substances can only be regarded as « the ultimate subjects of inherence » of these predicates. Nevertheless, it will be argued that men and animals, although they are not substances, may be considered the « subjects of attribution » of such predicates, since they have a specific unit, namely, a « unity of composition », which ensures that attribution. Therefore, the thesis will be developed in three main axes. From an examination of the Cartesian theory of substance and its definitions, we analyze the concept of extended substance, taking into account the existing debate between monistic and pluralistic interpretations of this concept. In this context, we examine the specificity of the human body in relation to other bodies of nature, considering certain aspects of the Cartesian theory of animal machines. Then we address the question of the unity of man, as well as other types of unity recognized by Descartes. Finally, we examine the Cartesian theory of causality in order to determine which theories of causality, interactionism, or occasionalism, in Descartes view, could serve as explanatory models for sentiments in humans and animals. The hypothesis to be defended in this thesis is consistent with the view that the Cartesian theory of three particular primitive notions, namely, thought, extension, and union, is fully compatible with the metaphysical dualism of substances that Descartes proposed, and therefore does not imply a weakening of the latter.