6533b7d6fe1ef96bd12659d9
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Beyond the Law and Finance Approach: The Shareholders' Cognitive Role and Its Effects on the Analysis of Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance
Gérard Charreauxsubject
FinanceCapital structurebusiness.industryFinancial riskmedia_common.quotation_subjectCorporate governanceControl (management)Principal–agent problemShareholderLawEconomicsFunction (engineering)businessExplanatory powermedia_commondescription
The dominant law and finance approach of ownership structure and corporate governance is based on an unrealistic assumption, that of a total complete separation between ownership and control, in particular in the European nations. This approach based on the seminal Berle and Means' analysis and on agency theory, postulates that shareholders carry only a financial function limited to equity financing and assumption of financial risk. In view of the actual ownership structures, this approach has a weak explanatory power. Therefore, this article proposes another model, based on the cognitive role - directing and contribution of competences -, that the main shareholders often keep. It is possible to consider this model as a component of a corporate governance theory extended to cognitive variables.
year | journal | country | edition | language |
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2004-01-01 | SSRN Electronic Journal |