6533b7d8fe1ef96bd126af13
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot equilibria in a mixed markets exchange economy
Ludovic A. Juliensubject
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryStackelberg-CournotGeneral equilibrium theoryContinuum (topology)05 social sciencesEconomyCournot competition[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceComputer Science::Multiagent SystemsNonlinear Sciences::Adaptation and Self-Organizing SystemsMarket exchange0502 economics and business[No keyword available]EconomicsStackelberg competitionExchange economy[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances050207 economics[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceMathematical economicsComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS050205 econometricsdescription
In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers’ best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012-01-01 |