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RESEARCH PRODUCT

Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline

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Abstract [Fershtman, C., Seidmann, D., 1993. Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment. Journal of Economic Theory 60, 306–321] showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. In this paper we analyse the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in an infinite horizon negotiation in which a deadline can arise with positive probability. We obtain that when the commitment possesses a sufficiently large revocable part not only the inefficient delays disappear and an immediate agreement is reached but also the commitment has a value. On the other hand, when the commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability, there exist inefficient delays in equilibrium and the commitment continues to having a value.