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RESEARCH PRODUCT

The consequences of supply gaps in two‐dimensional policy spaces for voter turnout and political support: The case of economically left‐wing and culturally right‐wing citizens in Western Europe

Sven HillenNils D. Steiner

subject

021110 strategic defence & security studiesSociology and Political Sciencemedia_common.quotation_subject05 social sciencesAuthoritarianism0211 other engineering and technologies02 engineering and technologySpace (commercial competition)Affect (psychology)Democracy0506 political scienceEuropean Social SurveyPoliticsPolitical economyPolitical scienceVoting050602 political science & public administrationLeft-wing politicsmedia_common

description

Parties with left-wing positions on economic issues and right-wing (i.e., authoritarian) positions on cultural issues have been historically largely absent from the supply side of the policy space of Western European democracies. Yet, many citizens hold such left-authoritarian issue attitudes. This article addresses the hypotheses that left-authoritarian citizens are less likely to vote, less satisfied with the democratic process and have lower levels of political trust when there is a left-authoritarian supply gap. Using data for 14 Western European countries from the European Social Survey 2008 in the main analysis, it is shown that left-authoritarians are less likely to vote and exhibit lower levels of satisfaction with democracy and political trust. A supplementary analysis of national election studies from Finland before and after the electoral breakthrough of the left-authoritarian True Finns Party in 2011 indicates that whether left-authoritarians participate less and believe less in the efficacy of voting is contingent on the presence of a strong left- authoritarian party. This study illuminates how constrained party supply in a two-dimensional policy space can affect voter turnout as well as political support, and has broader implications for the potential further rise of left-authoritarian challenger parties.

https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12348