6533b7ddfe1ef96bd127478c

RESEARCH PRODUCT

R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms

Ana MauleonAna MauleonVincent VannetelboschJosé J. Sempere-monerris

subject

OligopolyMicroeconomicsOrder (business)EconomicsPairwise comparisonStability (probability)

description

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of RD otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse is not true. Strong stability even reinforces this conflict. However, once unions settle wages such conflict disappears: the complete network is the unique pairwise and strongly stable network and is the efficient network whatever the spillovers.

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.624484