6533b7defe1ef96bd1276868
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Competing R&D Joint Ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers
Antonio Tesorieresubject
Economics and Econometricsmedia_common.quotation_subjectCartelSocial WelfareCompetitor analysisEconomic surplusCournot competitionSettore SECS-P/06 - Economia ApplicataGeneral Business Management and AccountingProfit (economics)MicroeconomicsR&D cartel competition R&D spillovers R&D policy endogenous asymmetryEconomicsWelfaremedia_commonPublic financedescription
This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospective Cournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize joint profit. It studies how R&D activity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare vary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium with second best R&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results show that the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adopted and on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014-09-11 |