6533b825fe1ef96bd1283294
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations
Tamer BasarDario BausoDario Bausosubject
0209 industrial biotechnologyNon-cooperative gameGame mechanicsSequential gameComputer scienceComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGGeneral EngineeringCombinatorial game theory02 engineering and technology01 natural sciencesOptimal control010101 applied mathematicsMicroeconomicsDifferential game020901 industrial engineering & automationMean-field gameRepeated gameSimultaneous gameMean-field games; Coalitional game theory; Differential games; Optimal controlCoalitional game theorySettore MAT/09 - Ricerca Operativa0101 mathematicsVideo game designGame theoryMathematical economicsdescription
This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016-11-01 |