6533b836fe1ef96bd12a11fe
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Corporate Governance Mechanisms for Monitoring or Empowering CEOS? A Study of Chinese Listed Firms
Ilan AlonIlan AlonIlan AlonHelen Wei Husubject
business.industrymedia_common.quotation_subjectCorporate governancePrincipal–agent problemStewardship theoryComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTINGAccountingContext (language use)Public relationsIndependenceEmpirical researchWork (electrical)businessChinamedia_commondescription
This study examines the impact of governance mechanisms in monitoring or empowering top executives on firm performance. We distinguish between two competing theories, namely agency theory and stewardship theory, which hold conflicting assumptions about CEOs behaviour and hence offer different recommendations concerning corporate governance structure. We conduct an empirical study based on 837 publicly listed companies in China over the period of 2005-2007, the findings of this study provide strong support for stewardship theory. The results suggest that governance mechanisms that can empower CEOs work better in the Chinese context, specifically, a longer CEO tenure and lower board independence can have positive effects on firm performance.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008-01-01 | SSRN Electronic Journal |