6533b839fe1ef96bd12a6d3d
RESEARCH PRODUCT
What is an indirect speech act?
Jörg Meibauersubject
050101 languages & linguisticsLinguistics and LanguageGeneral Computer SciencePoint (typography)PolitenessLiteral (mathematical logic)media_common.quotation_subject05 social sciencesCognitive pragmaticsRealization (linguistics)06 humanities and the arts0603 philosophy ethics and religionLanguage and LinguisticsIndirect speechLinguisticsSpeech actBehavioral NeuroscienceHistory and Philosophy of Science060302 philosophy0501 psychology and cognitive sciencesPsychologySentencemedia_commondescription
Abstract The notion of an indirect speech act is at the very heart of cognitive pragmatics, yet, after nearly 50 years of orthodox (Searlean) speech act theory, it remains largely unclear how this notion can be explicated in a proper way. In recent years, two debates about indirect speech acts have stood out. First, a debate about the Searlean idea that indirect speech acts constitute a simultaneous realization of a secondary and a primary act. Second, a debate about the reasons for the use of indirect speech acts, in particular about whether this reason is to be seen in strategic advantages and/or observation of politeness demands. In these debates, the original pragmatic conception of sentence types as indicators of illocutionary force seems to have been getting lost. Here, I go back to the seemingly outdated “literal force hypothesis” (see Levinson 1983: 263–264) and point out how it is still relevant for cognitive pragmatics.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-12-31 | Pragmatics and its Interfaces as related to the Expression of Intention |