6533b852fe1ef96bd12aa3b1
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Executive remuneration determinants: New evidence from meta-analysis
Cristina De FuentesRubén PorcunaFabián Blanessubject
C.E.O. compensation; C.E.O. pay; pay–performance; corporate governance; managerial power theory; meta-analysisc.e.o. payEconomics and Econometricsmanagerial power theorybusiness.industryCorporate governancecorporate governanceAccountinglcsh:Regional economics. Space in economicsc.e.o. compensationlcsh:HD72-88lcsh:HT388lcsh:Economic growth development planningmeta-analysisMeta-analysisRemunerationpay–performanceBusinessStock (geology)description
This meta-analysis takes stock of 121 C.E.O. pay studies published between 1998 and 2018 with the objective of identifying the main drivers of C.E.O. pay from a global perspective and contributing to the agency vs managerial debate on this ground. The meta-results disclose a positive C.E.O. pay–performance correlation (the highest correlation coefficient corresponds to Earnings per share with a 34%) as the agency theory prescribes and the governance policies promote. However, firm size still predominates as the main driver of C.E.O. pay (correlation coefficient is around 44%) according to managerial premises. Moreover, our results reconcile both approaches because results of the meta-regressions suggest that larger companies and more independent boards strengthen the pay–performance association. Additional analyses of moderating factors on C.E.O. pay forces do not provide robust conclusions, though, they suggest: (1) weak impact, if any, of both the Cadbury Report and the S.O.X.; and (2) lack of homogeneity in the banking industry despite its specific regulation.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-11-05 | Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja |