6533b85dfe1ef96bd12bf26f
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Breakdown in Multilateral Negotiations
Michael HewerDaniel Göllersubject
Large classEconomics and Econometricsmedia_common.quotation_subjectReservationContrast (statistics)Outcome (game theory)Zero (linguistics)Complementary goodMicroeconomicsNegotiationCoase theoremComplete informationEconomicsComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETYmedia_commondescription
Abstract We analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers. Binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. In contrast to preexisting literature, we do not normalize the parties' reservation utilities to zero. We show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome, even if only two sellers are present.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-05-01 | SSRN Electronic Journal |