6533b871fe1ef96bd12d1182
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games
James Rodger FlemingMark CannonDario Bausosubject
Adversarial systemMathematical optimizationProcess (engineering)Game theory networks allocations robust receding horizon control.EconomicsSettore MAT/09 - Ricerca OperativaSet (psychology)Mathematical economicsGame theorydescription
We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions under which the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014-01-01 |