Search results for " Economic theory."
showing 8 items of 18 documents
The basic rules of social macrodynamics. The theory of reflexivity by George Soros
2012
Darbā apskatīti svarīgākie sociālās organizācijas evolūcijas mehānismi, kuri balstās uz sabiedrības kā atvērtas sistēmas modeli ar pozitīvu atgriezenisku saiti. Šādai sistēmas organizācijai pamatā ir Džordža Sorosa refleksivitātes teorija un viņa buma modelis, kurš pagaidām vispilnīgāk izskaidro sabiedrībā un tirgū notiekošos procesus neizmantojot matemātisko aprakstu.
Individual differences in adaptive choice strategies
2003
Abstract Individual differences in compensatory and non-compensatory choice processes remain an unresolved issue for decision process researchers. This study investigates the stability and nature of individual differences in choice processes when individuals adapt to changes in the structure of the choice environment, namely the correlation among the choice attributes. By means of process tracing techniques, between-subjects differences in choice processing (option-based or attribute based) were found to be stable across different tasks. Individuals with higher openness to experience and ability to solve reasoning tasks were found to be more adaptive, that is to switch more promptly their c…
Economising failure and assembling a failure regime
2023
Sociologists have largely neglected the topic of failure, and particularly the economising of failure, notwithstanding notable exceptions. This is puzzling, given the many adjacent literatures that have addressed the practices and processes of economising. Four features define our approach. First, it is argued that failure has none of the objectivity or inevitability often attributed to it. Second, it is suggested that failure be viewed as a variable ontology object. Third, attention is directed to the calculative infrastructures that operationalise the ideas of failing and failure, and enable them to be acted upon. Fourth, emphasis is placed on the importance of distinguishing between fail…
Excessive vs. insufficient entry in spatial models: When product design and market size matter
2020
Abstract Under spatial product differentiation and product design, we identify conditions for either excessive or insufficient firm entry. We extend previous settings, based on the Salop circular model, to analyze the combined role of positive demand elasticity and endogenous targeted product design. First, we show that, given the number of firms, the equilibrium level of targeted design is either excessive or insufficient, depending on demand elasticity. Second, with free entry, we show that the degree of targeted product design increases with the relative market size and decreases with demand elasticity. Based on these effects, the interplay between demand elasticity and market size yield…
Recensione di A. Roncaglia (2000). Piero Sraffa. His life, thought and cultural heritage. London: Routledge
2002
Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium
2010
We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the cost of memory goes to 0, includes the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. This result stands in sharp contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), who proved that when memory is free, the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games played by players with bounded computational power is a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Our result emphasizes the role of memory cost and of mixing when players have bounded c…
Financial Crises and Economic Depressions: An Introduction
2010
A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
2014
The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996). We demonstrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the \(\alpha \)-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting.