Search results for " Games"

Uniform measure density condition and game regularity for tug-of-war games

2018

We show that a uniform measure density condition implies game regularity for all 2 < p < ∞ in a stochastic game called “tug-of-war with noise”. The proof utilizes suitable choices of strategies combined with estimates for the associated stopping times and density estimates for the sum of independent and identically distributed random vectors. peerReviewed

Approachability in Population Games

2014

This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a population of individuals with given distribution on actions. First, convergence conditions are revisited based on the common prior on the population distribution, and we define the notion of \emph{1st-moment approachability}. Second, we develop a model of two coupled partial differential equations (PDEs) in the spirit of mean-field game theory: one describing the best-response of every player given the population distribution (this is a \emph{Hamilton-Jacobi-Bell…

Dynamic Demand and Mean-Field Games

2017

Within the realm of smart buildings and smart cities,\ud dynamic response management is playing an ever-increasing\ud role thus attracting the attention of scientists from different\ud disciplines. Dynamic demand response management involves a\ud set of operations aiming at decentralizing the control of loads\ud in large and complex power networks. Each single appliance\ud is fully responsive and readjusts its energy demand to the\ud overall network load. A main issue is related to mains frequency\ud oscillations resulting from an unbalance between supply and\ud demand. In a nutshell, this paper contributes to the topic by\ud equipping each signal consumer with strategic insight. In particu…

Robust linear quadratic mean-field games in crowd-seeking social networks.

2013

We consider a social network where opinions evolve following a stochastic averaging process under the influence of adversarial disturbances. We provide a robust mean-field game model in the spirit of H∞-optimal control, establish existence of a mean-field equilibrium, and analyze its stochastic stability.

Ringetteä ajatellen ja ymmärtäen : pelikäsitystä painottavan opetuksen tutkimus koululiikunnassa

2008

Wyjątkowość doświadczenia śmierci w artystycznych grach wideo

2015

Video games present different meanings of death than those conditioned by social and cultural contexts. Most games treat the motif of death instrumentally. Therefore, death is usually a norm and a rule in typical video games. However, art games present a different sense of death, one that defies its conventional meanings. The article analyses the different presentations of death in three art games: "Passage" (Rohrer, 2007), "The Graveyard" (Tale of Tales, 2008) and "Queers in Love at the End of the World" (Anthropy, 2013). These productions prove that video games are an excellent medium to offer players a deep emotional experience, which can also encourage taking a fundamental and more prof…

Strategic interactions on differentiated markets and public policies

2017

In economy, the competition analysis among firms have a significance importance because of the complexity of some elements. This thesis examines the strategic interactions on differentiated markets in general equilibrium while proposing the public policies to reduce the distortions due to the imperfect behaviors. This thesis takes into account the differentiation of products in order to obtain the new conclusions and/or to extend those existing. We thus pursues two objectives. Fisrt, the construction of a model of imperfect competition on differentiated markets in a general equilibrium framework. Second, the evaluation of the consequences of the model in terms of economic policies. At begin…

Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach

2008

We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…

Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium

2010

We study repeated games played by players with bounded computational power, where, in contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), the memory is costly. We prove a folk theorem: the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in mixed strategies, as the cost of memory goes to 0, includes the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. This result stands in sharp contrast to Abreu and Rubisntein (1988), who proved that when memory is free, the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games played by players with bounded computational power is a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Our result emphasizes the role of memory cost and of mixing when players have bounded c…

Mean Field Linear Quadratic Games with Set Up Costs

2013

This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-null. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game under large population. We also analyze the influence of an additional disturbance in the spirit of the literature on H∞ control. Numerical illustrations are provided. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.