Search results for "Combinatorial game theory"
showing 3 items of 13 documents
Robust dynamic cooperative games
2009
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables. In this work we still consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded disturbances. We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family of games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions’ values and corresponds to a specific game. We consider a dynamic context where while we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run, at each t…
Achieving Unbounded Resolution inFinitePlayer Goore Games Using Stochastic Automata, and Its Applications
2012
Abstract This article concerns the sequential solution to a distributed stochastic optimization problem using learning automata and the Goore game (also referred to as the Gur game in the related literature). The amazing thing about our solution is that, unlike traditional methods, which need N automata (where N determines the degree of accuracy), in this article, we show that we can obtain arbitrary accuracy by recursively using only three automata. To be more specific, the Goore game (GG) introduced in Tsetlin (1973) has the fascinating property that it can be resolved in a completely distributed manner with no inter-communication between the players. The game has recently found applicati…
Large Networks of Dynamic Agents: Consensus under Adversarial Disturbances
2012
This paper studies interactions among homogeneous social groups within the framework of large population games. Each group is represented by a network and the behavior described by a two-player repeated game. The contribution is three-fold. Beyond the idea of providing a novel two-level model with repeated games at a lower level and population games at a higher level, we also establish a mean field equilibrium and study state feedback best-response strategies as well as worst-case adversarial disturbances in that context.