Search results for "Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory"
showing 10 items of 87 documents
Robust dynamic cooperative games
2009
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables. In this work we still consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded disturbances. We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family of games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions’ values and corresponds to a specific game. We consider a dynamic context where while we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run, at each t…
A Neo2 bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero-sum games
1994
A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows andn columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonie and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the correspondingm × n utility …
Modeling the coupled return-spread high frequency dynamics of large tick assets
2015
Large tick assets, i.e. assets where one tick movement is a significant fraction of the price and bid-ask spread is almost always equal to one tick, display a dynamics in which price changes and spread are strongly coupled. We introduce a Markov-switching modeling approach for price change, where the latent Markov process is the transition between spreads. We then use a finite Markov mixture of logit regressions on past squared returns to describe the dependence of the probability of price changes. The model can thus be seen as a Double Chain Markov Model. We show that the model describes the shape of return distribution at different time aggregations, volatility clustering, and the anomalo…
Uniform measure density condition and game regularity for tug-of-war games
2018
We show that a uniform measure density condition implies game regularity for all 2 < p < ∞ in a stochastic game called “tug-of-war with noise”. The proof utilizes suitable choices of strategies combined with estimates for the associated stopping times and density estimates for the sum of independent and identically distributed random vectors. peerReviewed
Weighting Elementary Prices in Consumer Price Index Construction Using Spatial Autocorrelation
2013
The Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) are used in current economic systems to measure inflation. When constructing CPIs, however, official institutions have systematically overlooked the spatial dimension of elementary prices. Ignoring the fact that prices are collected at geographical locations implicitly implies considering prices as spatially independent, when in fact they are not. To solve this problem, this article proposes to weight basic price data by taking into account the spatial correlation they display. The weighted geometric and arithmetic means suggested generalize and improve the simple geometric and arithmetic means currently in use.
Approachability in Population Games
2014
This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a population of individuals with given distribution on actions. First, convergence conditions are revisited based on the common prior on the population distribution, and we define the notion of \emph{1st-moment approachability}. Second, we develop a model of two coupled partial differential equations (PDEs) in the spirit of mean-field game theory: one describing the best-response of every player given the population distribution (this is a \emph{Hamilton-Jacobi-Bell…
Convex semi-infinite games
1986
This paper introduces a generalization of semi-infinite games. The pure strategies for player I involve choosing one function from an infinite family of convex functions, while the set of mixed strategies for player II is a closed convex setC inRn. The minimax theorem applies under a condition which limits the directions of recession ofC. Player II always has optimal strategies. These are shown to exist for player I also if a certain infinite system verifies the property of Farkas-Minkowski. The paper also studies certain conditions that guarantee the finiteness of the value of the game and the existence of optimal pure strategies for player I.
Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application
2008
We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto op…
Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
2018
Abstract This paper focuses on multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and where a representative agent may have non-monotonic preferences. In this framework, the set of firms’ profits (which comes from efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibria) is the Pareto frontier of some projection of the core of the game. We show that under monotonicity efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibria are achieved by single offers and the equilibrium characterization is easy to obtain. When dealing with non-monotonic preferences the problem becomes more challenging. Then, we define a pair of primal–dual linear programming problems that fully identifies the core of the game. A set of modified versions of t…
A mixed 0-1 linear programming approach to the computation of all pure-strategy nash equilibria of a finite n -person game in normal form
2014
Published version of an article in the journal: Mathematical Problems in Engineering. Also available from the publisher at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/640960 A main concern in applications of game theory is how to effectively select a Nash equilibrium, especially a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a finite n -person game in normal form. This selection process often requires the computation of all Nash equilibria. It is well known that determining whether a finite game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is an NP-hard problem and it is difficult to solve by naive enumeration algorithms. By exploiting the properties of pure strategy and multilinear terms in the payoff functions, this p…