Search results for "Computer Science::Cryptography and Security"
showing 10 items of 36 documents
"Table 1" of "Measurement of inclusive K*(892)0, Phi(1020) and K*2(1430)0 production in hadronic Z decays."
1996
SIG in (1/SIG) is the total hadronic cross section. The statistical and systematic errors are combined quadratically.
Nonmalleable encryption of quantum information
2008
We introduce the notion of "non-malleability" of a quantum state encryption scheme (in dimension d): in addition to the requirement that an adversary cannot learn information about the state, here we demand that no controlled modification of the encrypted state can be effected. We show that such a scheme is equivalent to a "unitary 2-design" [Dankert et al.], as opposed to normal encryption which is a unitary 1-design. Our other main results include a new proof of the lower bound of (d^2-1)^2+1 on the number of unitaries in a 2-design [Gross et al.], which lends itself to a generalization to approximate 2-design. Furthermore, while in prime power dimension there is a unitary 2-design with =…
"Table 1" of "Study of $e^+e^- \rightarrow p\bar{p}$ in the vicinity of $\psi(3770)$"
2014
Summary of results at center-of-mass energies from 3.65 to 3.90 GeV. N(SIG) is the number of E+ E- --> P P events; EPSILON is the detection efficiency; L is the integrated luminosity; (1 + DELTA)(DRESSED) is the initial state radiation correction factor without the vacuum polarization correction; and SIG(OBS), SIG(DRESSED) and SIG(BORN) are the observed cross section, the dressed cross section and the Born cross section, respectively.
"Table 1" of "Search for single top production in e+ e- collisions at s**(1/2) = 189-GeV - 202-GeV."
2000
SIG(C=LEPT) and SIG(C=HADR) are the cross sections upper limits evaluated for leptonic and hadronic decay modes of the W-boson, while SIG(C=COMB) are the values obtained by combining the leptonic and hadronic W-boson decay channels. All cross sections values are obtained under assumption of BR(TQ --> W+ BQ) = 100 %.
"Table 3" of "Lowest Q**2 measurement of the gamma* p --> delta reaction: Probing the pionic contribution."
2006
Measured value of SIG(C=LT) as a function of the pion angle relative to thevirtual photon direction.
"Table 2" of "Lowest Q**2 measurement of the gamma* p --> delta reaction: Probing the pionic contribution."
2006
Measured value of SIG(C=TT) as a function of the pion angle relative to thevirtual photon direction.
A robust blind 3-D mesh watermarking based on wavelet transform for copyright protection
2019
Nowadays, three-dimensional meshes have been extensively used in several applications such as, industrial, medical, computer-aided design (CAD) and entertainment due to the processing capability improvement of computers and the development of the network infrastructure. Unfortunately, like digital images and videos, 3-D meshes can be easily modified, duplicated and redistributed by unauthorized users. Digital watermarking came up while trying to solve this problem. In this paper, we propose a blind robust watermarking scheme for three-dimensional semiregular meshes for Copyright protection. The watermark is embedded by modifying the norm of the wavelet coefficient vectors associated with th…
Neural Networks, Inside Out: Solving for Inputs Given Parameters (A Preliminary Investigation)
2021
Artificial neural network (ANN) is a supervised learning algorithm, where parameters are learned by several back-and-forth iterations of passing the inputs through the network, comparing the output with the expected labels, and correcting the parameters. Inspired by a recent work of Boer and Kramer (2020), we investigate a different problem: Suppose an observer can view how the ANN parameters evolve over many iterations, but the dataset is oblivious to him. For instance, this can be an adversary eavesdropping on a multi-party computation of an ANN parameters (where intermediate parameters are leaked). Can he form a system of equations, and solve it to recover the dataset?
Quantum Attacks on Classical Proof Systems - The Hardness of Quantum Rewinding
2014
Quantum zero-knowledge proofs and quantum proofs of knowledge are inherently difficult to analyze because their security analysis uses rewinding. Certain cases of quantum rewinding are handled by the results by Watrous (SIAM J Comput, 2009) and Unruh (Eurocrypt 2012), yet in general the problem remains elusive. We show that this is not only due to a lack of proof techniques: relative to an oracle, we show that classically secure proofs and proofs of knowledge are insecure in the quantum setting. More specifically, sigma-protocols, the Fiat-Shamir construction, and Fischlin's proof system are quantum insecure under assumptions that are sufficient for classical security. Additionally, we show…
H2S: A Secure and Efficient Data Aggregative Retrieval Scheme in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
2009
In unattended wireless sensor networks, data are stored locally and retrieved on demand. To efficiently transmit the collector’s retrieval results, data are aggregated along being forwarded. The data confidentiality and integrity should be protected at the intermediate nodes. End-to-end encryption or hop-by-hop encryption based schemes are not efficient. Straightforward homomorphic encryption based scheme is not compromise resilient. To achieve all the desires, we propose a scheme - H2S by making use of both homomorphic secret sharing and homomorphic encryption. The security and efficiency of our scheme are justified by extensive analysis.