Search results for "D62"

showing 6 items of 6 documents

On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

2002

In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the instantaneous pay-off function and the state equation of the game. Secondly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence both equilibria are identical independently of the player being the leader of the game. A survey of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting i…

Computer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryCorrelated equilibriumMathematical optimizationjel:D62Differential Games; Stationary Feedback Nash Equilibrium; Stationary Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium; Coincidence.ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGjel:C73Trembling hand perfect equilibriumjel:H41Differential games stationary feedback Nash equilibrium stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.symbols.namesakeEquilibrium selectionNash equilibriumBest responsejel:Q20jel:Q30Repeated gameEconomicsStackelberg competitionsymbolsEpsilon-equilibriumMathematical economicsSSRN Electronic Journal
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Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach

2012

This article provides a survey of dynamic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus is on environmental problems that are caused by a stock pollutant as are the cases of the acid rain and climate change. For this reason, the survey only reviews the literature that utilizes dynamic state-space games to analyze the formation of international agreements to control pollution. The survey considers both the cooperative approach and the noncooperative approach. In the case of the latter, the survey distinguishes between the models that assume binding agreements and those that assume the contrary. An evaluation of the state of the art is presented in the conclusions along w…

Economics and Econometricsjel:D62Control (management)jel:C73Climate changejel:H41Management Monitoring Policy and LawPublic goodEnvironmental economicsMicroeconomicsjel:Q50Dynamic modelsAccountingDifferential gameEconomicsFinanceExternalityExternalities; public goods; pollution; international environmental agreements; state-space dynamic games; differential games; cooperative and noncooperative games; trigger strategies
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- STRATEGIC PIGOUVIAN TAXATION, STOCK EXTERNALITIES AND POLLUTING NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES

2001

This paper extends Wirl and Dockner¿s (1995) model designed to analyze the long-term bilateral interdependence between a resource exporting cartel and a coalition of resource importing country governments. Firstly, depletion effects are introduced into the analysis of the intertemporal properties of a pigouvian tax. Secondly, the feedback Stackelberg equilibria are computed. The results show that the dynamics of the tax depends critically on the level of the marginal environmental damage. Moreover, they also show that the tax defined by the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is a neutral pigouvian tax in the sense that it only corrects the market inefficiency caused by the stock externality. H…

Economics and Econometricsjel:D62Welfare economicsjel:F02jel:H23Externalidad de stock imposición pigouviana impuesto sobre las emisiones de CO2 Stock externality pigouvian taxation carbon taxMicroeconomicsMarkov perfect nash equilibriumEconomicsjel:Q48FinanceStock (geology)Non-renewable resourceExternalityjel:Q28
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The effect of weight on labor market outcomes: An application of genetic instrumental variables

2019

This paper contributes to the literature on the labor market consequences of obesity by using a novel instrument: genetic risk score, which reflects the predisposition to higher body mass index (BMI) across many genetic loci. We estimate instrumental variable models of the effect of BMI on labor market outcomes using Finnish data that have many strengths, for example, BMI that is measured rather than self‐reported, and data on earnings and social income transfers that are from administrative tax records and are thus free of the problems associated with nonresponse, reporting error or top coding. The empirical results are sensitive to whether we use a narrower or broader genetic risk score, …

EmploymentsosiaaliturvaobesitytulonsiirrotKansanterveystiede ympäristö ja työterveys - Public health care science environmental and occupational healthJ01J24Body Mass IndexI10502 economics and businessHumansoverweightgeneticssocial income transfers050207 economicsFinlandResearch Articlesansiotulot050208 financeperinnöllisyystiedeSalaries and Fringe BenefitsI12Body Weight05 social sciencestyöllisyysylipainogenetiset tekijätModels EconomicD62J78. Economic growthIncomeJ3lihavuusearningsResearch Article
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SELE (selectin E, endothelial adhesion molecule 1)

2008

This gene can be found on Chromosome 1 at location 167,958,406-167,969,803. The gene is composed of 14 exons, spanning approximately 12 kb of genomic DNA in the telomere-to-centromere orientation on chromosome region 1q22-1q25. The promoter region is not included.

SELE E-Selectin CD62E ELAM
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited

2004

In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations and also ignoring the fact that emissions must be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values…

international externalities self-enforcing environmental agreements Stackelberg equilibrium non-negative emissions constraintsEconomics and EconometricsPublic economicsjel:D62jel:C72Transboundary pollutionjel:F02Grand coalitionMicroeconomicsrestrictjel:Q20Key (cryptography)EconomicsStackelberg competitionOxford Economic Papers
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