Search results for "Deterrence"
showing 10 items of 26 documents
Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs
2017
Abstract I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of identical leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium ex…
Stackelberg Equilibrium with Many Leaders and Followers. The Case of Setup Costs
2016
I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showi…
Carry a big stick, or no stick at all
2016
We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocit…
Oviposition deterrence and repellent activities of selected essential oils against Tuta absoluta Meyrick (Lepidoptera: Gelechiidae): laboratory and g…
2022
AbstractTuta absoluta, an invasive pinworm characterized by high reproductive potential and adaptation to different agroecological conditions, cause serious damage to tomato crops. Chemical control with synthetic insecticides is widely used to control this pest, although pesticides exhibit side effects on non-target organisms and negatively impact the environment, with the occurrence of resistance to some active substances in the target pest. The use of essential oils (EOs) from aromatic or officinal plants could represent an environmentally safe control method, alternative to synthetic insecticide application. In this work we investigated the effect of EOs from Spanish oregano, laurel, bas…
Paolo Sylos Labini Vindicated
2017
In the first part of our chapter we critically discuss i) Modigliani’s 1958 interpretation of Sylos Labini’s Oligopolio e Progresso Tecnico (1957), ii) the following debate concerning the Sylos Postulate −the assumption according to which “potential entrants behave as though they expected existing firms to adopt the policy most unfavourable to them, namely, the policy of maintaining output while reducing the price (or accepting reductions) to the extent required to enforce such an output policy” − and iii) the incumbent’s choice of productive capacity to install as strategic entry deterrence. In the second part of the chapter we develop a model in which, as in Dixit (1980), there are three …
Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
2021
Recent advances in information and communication technologies have increased the incentives for firms to acquire information about rivals. These advances may have major implications for market entry because they make it easier for potential entrants to gather valuable information about, for example, an incumbent’s cost structure. However, little theoretical research has actually analyzed this question. This paper advances the literature by extending a one-sided asymmetric information version of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1982) limit pricing model. Here, the entrant is allowed access to an intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision that generates a noisy signal on the incumbent’s cost struct…
Geographical Distribution of Crime in Italian Provinces: A Spatial Econometric Analysis
2008
For a long time social sciences scholars from different fields have devoted their attention to identifying the causes leading to commit criminal offences and recently lots of studies have included the analysis of spatial effects. Respect to the Italian crime phenomenon some stylized facts exist: high spatial and time variability and presence of "organised crime" (e.g. Mafia and Camorra) deep-seated in some local territorial areas. Using explanatory spatial data analysis, the paper firstly explores the spatial structure and distribution of four different typologies of crimes (murders, thefts, frauds, and squeezes) in Italian provinces in two years, 1999 and 2003. ESDA allows us to detect som…
Punishment as Defiance: Deterrence and Perverse Effects in the Case of Expressive Crime
2013
Expressive crime contrasts with instrumental crime in that delinquents do not seek material benefits. Law-breakers are motivated by the desire to “make a statement”, possibly against majority attitudes in the society. Fighting expressive crime is complicated by this fact in that increasing intervention may have counter-effects. In this paper, I present a model of expressive crime. Delinquents are motivated to perform the illegal action because it transmits a signal. If the punishment associated with the crime affects the value of this signal positively, an increase in punishment may serve as defiance, and not as deterrence. Accordingly, the number of law violations may increase if those def…
An economic perspective on crime, its costs, crime fighting and rehabilitation efforts
2010
This study will examine the economic issues surrounding crime and reintegration measures aimed at prisoners, particularly but not exclusively in Germany. To do so it will be necessary to give an overview about the crime and crime-fighting situation in Germany. The focus is on violent and street crime. White collar crime will be mentioned only briefly. The starting point will be to examine the cost of crime and the problems concerning its measurement. These include for example the economic costs of murder or the largely ignored cost of rehabilitating the victims of crimes such as rape. They often suffer from severe trauma. Further it will prove necessary to add the indirect, immaterial costs…
Impact of deterrence theory methods on employees' information security behavior
2017
Peloteteoria (Deterrence theory) on alun perin psykologiassa ja kriminologiassa käytetty termi, ja sen mukaan rangaistuksen pelko estää yksilöä toimimasta vastoin lakia ja sääntöjä. Digitalisoituvassa maailmassa on viimeisen kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana tehty paljon tutkimusta, jossa peloteteoriaa on sovellettu tietojärjestelmien sekä tietoturvakäyttäytymisen kontekstiin. Tutkielma käsittelee käytössä olevia peloteteorian keinoja tässä kontekstissa sekä nii-den vaikutuksia työntekijöiden tietoturvakäyttäytymiseen. Tutkielma on toteutettu kirjallisuuskatsauksena ja sen tarkoitus on määritellä peloteteorian käsitettä tietojärjestelmien ja tietoturvakäyttäytymisen kontekstissa sekä tutkia olem…