Search results for "Differential game"
showing 5 items of 15 documents
Strategic Behavior and Efficiency in the Common Property Extraction of Groundwater
2002
Groundwater has always been regarded as a common property resource where entry is restricted by land ownership and private exploitation is inefficient. In 1980, Gisser and Sanchez presented a first estimation of this inefficiency, cornparing socially optimal exploitation with private (competitive) exploitation using a model with linear water demand, average extraction cost independent of the rate of extraction and linearly decreasing with respect to the water table level. They characterized the private exploitation of the aquifer assuming that farmers are myopic and choose their rate of extraction to maximize their current profits, whereas optimal exploitation is obtained by maximizing the …
A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control
2002
Abstract In this note, we evaluate the scope of Dockner and Long’s [Journal of Environment Economics and Management 24 (1993) 13] conclusion on the efficiency of the non-cooperative outcome in a differential game of international pollution control. We also complete the study of the different equilibria the differential game can present. Our results show that their conclusion requires that the initial value of the stock of pollution be higher than the Pareto-efficient pollution stock so that the equilibrium path of emissions involves a decreasing stock of pollution. Our results also show that the application of the procedure proposed by Tsutsui and Mino [Journal of Economic Theory 52 (1990) …
Mean Field Linear Quadratic Games with Set Up Costs
2013
This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-null. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game under large population. We also analyze the influence of an additional disturbance in the spirit of the literature on H∞ control. Numerical illustrations are provided. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
J curve for abatement with transboundary pollution
2002
In this note an alternative framework to Selden and Song's (1995) work is proposed in order to clarify some of their results and verify whether the relationship between pollution abatement and national income can be drawn as a J curve when there is more than one country involved. As Selden and Song do, pollution is considered as a flow externality. Their model is extended to a two country case which requires the use of differential games. The optimisation problem is decomposed into two stages, the pollution abatement and the accumulation problem. A J curve for pollution abatement is replicated and a static comparative analysis confirms that the smaller the rate of discount and/or the less p…
On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited
2004
In this paper the scope of Bergstrom’s (1982) results is studied. Moreover, his analysis is extended assuming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extractions. For the case of a competitive market it is found that the optimal policy is a constant tariff if extraction is costless. However, with depletion effects, the optimal tariff must ultimately be decreasing. For the case of a monopolistic market the results depend crucially on the kind of strategies the importing country governments can play and on whether the monopolist chooses the price or extraction rate. For a price-setting monopolist it is shown that the importing countries cannot use a tariff to capture monopoly …