Search results for "Falsity"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
Conceptual Confusion is Not Always a Bad Thing – The Curious Case of European Radical Right Studies
2018
Over the course of many years, as a teacher, scholar, and friend, Ruth Zimmerling has impressed on me the importance of precisely defining one’s concepts. After all, if there is no agreement on the intension and extension of a concept, it is impossible “to assess the truth or falsity or, more generally, the correctness or incorrectness, of propositions, hypotheses or theories” (Zimmerling 2005: 15). The statement is almost self-evident: Without precisely defined concepts, the whole endeavour of science becomes pointless, and scholarly discourses are bound to turn into dialogues of the deaf.
More and More Lies. A New Distinction and its Consequences
2017
En este artículo presentamos una distinción (dentro de la categoría de ‘mentiras engañadoras’) entre dos tipos de mentiras: doxogénicas y falsificadoras, definidas en términos de las distintas condiciones que deben satisfacer; y defendemos la significación analítica de esta distinción, que ha sido ignorada en la bibliografía sobre la mentira. Además, sostenemos que la existencia de estos dos tipos de mentiras plantea un reto a la viabilidad de una definición unificada de las mentiras engañadoras, y ni siquiera una definición disyuntiva impediría que pensásemos que estamos ante fenómenos distintos. In this article, we present a distinction (within the category of ‘deceptive …
On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition
2013
In this paper, we put forward a conceptual argument for the Falsity Condition for lying, upon the assumption that lying is a form of deception. We argue that if the definition of lying did not include the Falsity Condition, then successful lying would not secure that the addressee ends up believing a falsehood (about what the lie is about), which is necessary for deceiving, and then successful lying (as such) would not necessarily be a form of deception.