Search results for "Game Theory"
showing 10 items of 498 documents
Innovative governance from public policy unities
2016
Abstract This study examines which configurations explain the public policy for innovative governance through comparative qualitative analysis (QCA). The research analyzes the sub-system conditions through a case of Vietnam. The results show the minimum configurations of key variable conditions to achieve the outcome.
Influence of Time Pressure on the Outcome of Intercultural Commercial Negotiations
2016
ABSTRACTIt is essential, in commercial negotiations, to know how time pressure is expressed among customers and suppliers and which its effect on the outcomes of negotiation is. Must pressure be applied or not? In order to solve this question, 21 customer/supplier negotiation case studies were carried out (intercultural and intracultural). We have evidenced that an adequate time pressure, at low levels, produced outcomes that tend to be positive. Also, the national culture of the negotiators may influence the decision about using or not time pressure in these processes; especially when considering In-Group Collectivism and Uncertainty Avoidance dimensions.
A family life cycle model adapted to the Spanish environment
2001
Aims to demonstrate, from a marketing and market segmentation point of view, the need to adapt the construct of the family life cycle to the particular features of the Spanish social environment, given the obvious differences in the structure of Spanish households in relation to the USA. From this marketing and cross‐cultural approach, a review of the literature has been conducted on the evolution of the construct and the most significant models that have been arising as the outcome of that evolution. A new life cycle model has been designed reflecting these particular features. Also, on the basis of data taken from the Family Budgets Survey, the capacity of the adapted model has been analy…
Quasi-nash equilibria for non-convex distributed power allocation games in cognitive radios
2013
In this paper, we consider a sensing-based spectrum sharing scenario in cognitive radio networks where the overall objective is to maximize the sum-rate of each cognitive radio user by optimizing jointly both the detection operation based on sensing and the power allocation, taking into account the influence of the sensing accuracy and the interference limitation to the primary users. The resulting optimization problem for each cognitive user is non-convex, thus leading to a non-convex game, which presents a new challenge when analyzing the equilibria of this game where each cognitive user represents a player. In order to deal with the non-convexity of the game, we use a new relaxed equilib…
Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors
2013
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic, stochastic or interval valued TU games as it combines dynamics of the game with an allocation protocol for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The protocol is an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers a paradigmatic mathematical description of negotiation and bargaining processes. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protoc…
Learning for allocations in the long-run average core of dynamical cooperative TU games
2011
We consider repeated coalitional TU games characterized by unknown but bounded and time-varying coalitions' values. We build upon the assumption that the Game Designer uses a vague measure of the extra reward that each coalition has received up to the current time to learn on how to re-adjust the allocations among the players. As main result, we present an allocation rule based on the extra reward variable that converges with probability one to the core of the long-run average game. Analogies with stochastic stability theory are put in evidence.
Distributed <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="TeX">$n$</tex-math></inline-formula>-Player Approachability and Consensus in…
2015
We study a distributed allocation process where, at each time, every player: i) proposes a new bid based on the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes the grand …
Multicell power allocation method based on game theory for inter-cell interference coordination
2009
As a new technology, coordinated multipoint (CoMP) transmission is included in LTE-Advanced study item. Moreover, the network architecture in LTE-Advanced system is modified to take into account coordinated transmission. Under this background, a novel power allocation game model is established to mitigate inter-cell interference with cellular coordination. In the light of cellular cooperation relationship and centralized control in eNodeB, the power allocation in each served antenna unit aims to make signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) balanced among inter-cells. Through the proposed power allocation game algorithm, the users' SINR can reach the Nash equilibrium, making it feasib…
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL CONSENSUS PROBLEMS
2006
We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with fixed and switching topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors’ state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents’ initial state.We show that our protocol design is the solution of individual optimizations performed by the agents. This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. Under this perspective a supervisor entails the agents to reach a consensus by imposing individual objectives. We prove that such objectives can be chosen so that rational agents have a unique optimal proto…
Introducing migratory flows in life table construction
2012
The purpose of life tables is to describe the mortality behav iour of particular groups. The construction of general life tables is based on death statis tics and census figures of resident populations under the hypothesis of closed demographic sys tem. Among other assumptions, this hypothesis implicitly assumes that entries (immigrants) a nd exits (emigrants) of the population are usually not significant (being almost of the same magnitu de for each age compensating each other). This paper theoretically extends the classical sol ution to open demographic systems and studies the impact of this hypothesis in constructing a life table. In particular, using the data of residential variations m…