Search results for "Mathematical Economics"

Joint reality and Bell inequalities for consecutive measurements

2006

Some new Bell inequalities for consecutive measurements are deduced under joint realism assumption, using some perfect correlation property. No locality condition is needed. When the measured system is a macroscopic system, joint realism assumption substitutes the non-invasive hypothesis advantageously, provided that the system satisfies the perfect correlation property. The new inequalities are violated quantically. This violation can be expected to be more severe than in the case of precedent temporal Bell inequalities. Some microscopic and mesoscopic situations, in which the new inequalities could be tested, are roughly considered.

How to control stock markets

1994

This paper provides a different approach to the analysis of imperfect stock markets. The model we are concerned with is described by the interaction of three institutional classes of agents (the specialist trader, the professional trader and the non-professional trader), sharing different information. The dynamical discrete-time system obtained can be changed into a second-order linear difference equation forced by the fundamental value of the specialist trader. Using typical tools of control theory, we study the behaviour of the professional trader’s fundamental value influenced by the specialist’s one. © 1994 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Dynamic Portfolio Optimization with Stochastic Programming

2010

Stackelberg Equilibrium with Many Leaders and Followers. The Case of Setup Costs

2016

I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showi…

Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

2011

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.

About the Ghosh Model: Clarifications

2007

We examine the consistency of the Ghosh supply-d riven input-output model (SM) by respect to the traditional Leontief demand-drive n input-output model (LM); the variants considered are: primal and dual, quantity and value ; input prices are not considered. SM offers solutions of limited interest, being incapab le to separate quantities and prices or values and price indexes. Comparing the dual value SM to the primal of LM is wrong. Even if the agents are forced to buy inputs in SM, the interpre tation of SM as a centrally planned economy must be rejected but SM may serve for modeling interfirm relations or analyzing the structural interindustry change when the production function is not sp…

Is the Ghosh model interesting?

2009

International audience; The overall value of the Ghosh model is appraised. Its treatment of quantities and prices is scrutinized by examining the variant with data in quantities and prices, and the variant with data in value and price indexes. The methodology involves returning to the accounting equations and shows that: (i) the Ghosh model offers solutions of limited interest, being incapable of providing prices or price indexes separately from quantities; (ii) what is taken to be the equation of Ghosh's value model is actually that of Ghosh's physical model; (iii) the Ghosh model may serve for cost-push exercises, but the dual of the Leontief model performs the same task in a much simpler…

General Equilibrium Models of Monopolistic Competition: CRRA Versus CARA

2005

We analyze a class of "large group" Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models using multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) and additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions. We first prove that the MQS and AQS functions are equivalent to the "constant relative risk aversion" (CRRA) and "constant absolute risk aversion" (CARA) classes of functions, respectively. Whereas both approaches allow for closed-form solutions, only the AQS functions yield profit-maximizing prices that decrease in the mass of competing firms. We then characterize the equilibrium in both cases and discuss some possible applications of the AQS framework to trade, growth, and development.

Fair Executive Compensation: Is Kalai-Smorodinsky More Just than Nash ?

2015

By considering Phelps' curve, the best disagreement point (BATNA) and the gains of negotiation, we examine what a fair distribution of executive wages should be. Beyond equality and Rawls' maximin, we focus on equality-of-gains (Nash) and on relative-equality-of-gains (Kalai-Smorodinsky). Equality-of-gains is close to maximin; executives may not accept to bargain. Relative-equality-of-gains allows executives and workers to obtain equal gains in percentage; executive compensation is not intolerably high to the price of a higher total payroll.

The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence: the effect of misperceived signalling in a network formation process

2007

Social and economic networks are becoming increasingly popular in the last ten years, because of both the application of game theory to the network formation processes4, and the study of stochastic processes that fit the statistical properties of real world social networks.5 In the very recent years there have also been attempts to combine the contribution of these two streams of research, trying to find strategic models whose equilibria resemble the empirical data.6 A well known source of debate in the game theoretical approach is the incompatibility between stability and efficiency: in most of the models Nash equilibria are actually not the network architectures that maximize the overall …