Search results for "Mindreading"
showing 6 items of 6 documents
The intentional stance as structure learning: a computational perspective on mindreading
2015
Recent theories of mindreading explain the recognition of action, intention, and belief of other agents in terms of generative architectures that model the causal relations between observables (e.g., observed movements) and their hidden causes (e.g., action goals and beliefs). Two kinds of probabilistic generative schemes have been proposed in cognitive science and robotics that link to a "theory theory" and "simulation theory" of mindreading, respectively. The former compares perceived actions to optimal plans derived from rationality principles and conceptual theories of others' minds. The latter reuses one's own internal (inverse and forward) models for action execution to perform a look…
On Negation. What do we need to “say no”?
2011
By looking at first-language learning, we can see three broad categories in the acquisition of negation (see DIMROTH 2010 for a review):1) rejection/refusal; 2) disappearance/ non-existence/unfulfilled expectation; 3) denial. Denial is the most complex form of negation and the last to be acquired. I present the hypothesis that denial relies on false belief understanding. Evidence from normally developed and from Autistic subjects confirms this hypothesis. Competence in linguistic denial is usually acquired by the age of 2 years and a half and 3 years. According to this hypothesis, the attribution of false belief understanding could be lowered to the age of about 2 and a half years. Hence, p…
Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Mindreading
2012
Abstract The paper examines some of the questions emerging from the debate on mindreading regarding Quine’s legacy and contribution to a new agenda on the issue. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-psychology, a) which role folk psychology has to play according to Quine? b) was Quine’s account of mindreading closer to theory-theory, simulation theory or hybrid theory? c) was Quine a rationality theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and rationality theory incompatible as many would suggest? On the score of the answers to these questions, the paper tries to suggest a Quinean inspired blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strategies to explain mindreading.
Pensiero, percezione e linguaggio in W.V. Quine
2012
Notwithstanding his well known behaviorism, Quine connects language learning to the ability of understanding others by means of empathy, namely perceiving what an other is perceiving. The paper discusses and resolves the prima facie oddity between this thesis and Quine's criticism of propositional attitudes. It analyzes the notion of empathy and the cognitive mechanism underlying it. It explains also the role of empathy and of mindreading abilities in language learning and understanding others. Comparing Quine's account of mindreading to the main options in the current debate on the topic, it assess the validity of the Quinean inspired blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strate…
Is Embodiment All That We Need? Insights from the Acquisition of Negation
2012
Simulation of propositional content does not sufficiently explain real-life linguistic activity, even for action-related language. In addition, how we get from propositional content to implicit and inferential meaning needs to be explained. Indeed, simulative understanding is immediate, automatic and reflex-like while an explicit interpretative act, even if not always needed, is still a part of many linguistic activities. The aim of this paper is to present the hypothesis that speaking is a complex ability realized by means of at least two different mechanisms that are likely developed at different and consecutive steps of cognitive and linguistic development. The first mechanism has a neur…
Social Ontology, Collective Intentionality, and Mindreading
2013
Standard accounts of social reality take collective intentionality as the starting point of the creation and maintenance of social facts. But collective intentionality is enabled, as Searle suggests, by a more basic capacity to understand another person as an agent like oneself and as ready to engage in cooperative activities. We can coordinate our collective actions only insofar we are able to explain and predict the behavior of other persons, we can understand behavior only insofar we can mindread them, and we can mindread them only if we assume the constitutive role of rationality in action. Therefore …