Search results for "Principal-agent"
showing 8 items of 8 documents
Selection and Gratitude: Anonymity and gratitude
2018
What kind of candidate is selected into a job when the principal has to appoint a committee to measure the candidate's ability and select a winner through a call specifying a wage for the job? In a model where the principal fixes the wage anticipating the committee's choice, under a rather natural assumption about the committee's objective we find that if the committee takes into account the candidate's gratitude a candidate with less than first best ability will be selected in equilibrium. First best selection is achieved if the committee is anonymous to the candidates. If the committee could also set the wage the first best candidate would be selected, but the principal would be worse off…
European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
2022
AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk…
Extortion, firm's size and the sectoral allocation of capital
2014
Extortion of firms is a typical activity of organized crime such as Mafia. We develop a simple principal-agent model to find the Mafia-optimal extortion as a function of firm’s observable characteristics, specifically firm’s size. We test the predictions of the model on a unique dataset on extortion in Sicily, the Italian region where Mafia is most active. Our empirical findings show that i) extortion moderately increases with firm’s size ii) extortion is regressive, the average extortion rate ranging from approximately 40% of operating profits for small firms to 2% for large firms iii) extortion turns average cost function decreasing, therefore influencing market competition
The Economics of Extortion: Theory and Evidence on the Sicilian Mafia
2019
This paper studies extortion of firms operating in legal sectors by a profit-maximizing criminal organization. We develop a simple principal-agent model under asymmetric information to find the Mafia-optimal extortion as a function of firms' observable characteristics, namely size and sector. We test the predictions of the model on a unique dataset on extortion in Sicily, the Italian region where the most powerful criminal organization, the Mafia, operates. In line with our theoretical model, our empirical findings show that extortion is strongly concave in firm's size and highly regressive. The percentage of profits appropriated by Mafia ranges from 40% for small firms to 2% for large firm…
Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining
2008
Plea bargaining has become a central feature of criminal procedure in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. This paper explores an area seldom discussed in the economic literature on plea bargaining: the influence of the defence lawyer's fee contract on the terms of the bargain. In particular, it uses data from one jurisdiction of the impact on case trajectories of changes in publicly funded defence lawyers’ contracts to test the proposition that the nature of the lawyer's contract influences how cases are managed. An event study methodology on a pooled time-series cross-section data set of case trajectories before and after the change in the nature of the contract is used to examine whether the new p…
The European External Action Service: Torn apart between several principals or acting as a smart 'double-agent'?
2014
Published version of an article in the journal: Journal of Contemporary European Research. Also available from the publisher at: http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/605/494 Open Access The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a hybrid and compound institutional actor in the EU’s multi-level administration with delegated authority from the member states (MS) to conduct the EU’s external action. Substantial competences, notably in the field of Neighbourhood and Trade policies, as well as Development and Cooperation remain under the control of the European Commission (Commission). At the same time, also Members of the European Parliament (EP) are more clearly voicing their in…
Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design.
2012
We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft signal (the supervision signal) about the agent?s level of effort. We show that the agent?'s ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost of implementing the effcient equilibrium, leading to wage compression when the infl?uence cost is privately incurred by the agent. When manipulation activities negatively affect the agent?s productivity through the level of output, the design of infl?uence-free contracts that deter manipulation may lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that high-productivity workers face incentive sch…
ENABLING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES THROUGH DYNAMIC PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE. A CASE-STUDY OF …
2021
Lo scopo principale di questa ricerca è quello di inquadrare le possibili relazioni causali fra corruzione negli approvvigionamenti pubblici e performance delle amministrazioni locali. A tal fine, viene adottato un disegno di ricerca che integra dinamicamente metodi quantitativi e qualitativi in ogni fase del processo di studio. Gli approcci Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) e Governance (DPG), supportati da interviste approfondite non-strutturate, modellazioni formali e simulazioni quantitative, sono qui adottati per analizzare un caso di studio rappresentativo di un piccolo comune italiano in cui si sono verificati alcuni episodi di corruzione nelle attività di approvvigionamento nei p…