Search results for "RULE"
showing 10 items of 1403 documents
Se è vero che il diritto amministrativo globale non esiste, lo si dovrebbe inventare. L’Agenda 2030 delle Nazioni Unite e il Rule of Law
2022
The UN Agenda 2030 represents an important contribution to an international political strategy. In this article it is explained its origin and meaning, and it is shown that it is necessary to pursue its goals in the respect of the principles of the rule of law. A global administrative law it is requested.
Pre-convenzioni: un frammento dello Sfondo
2014
In this paper I argue that there exist conventions of a peculiar sort, which are neither norms nor regularities of behaviour, partaking of both. I proceed as follows. After a sketchy analysis of the meaning of ‘convention’, I give some examples of the kind of phenomena I have in mind: bodily skills, know-how, taste and style, habitus (P. Bourdieu), «disciplines» (M. Foucault). Then I group some arguments supporting my claim: (i) considerations about the identity conditions of precedents (D. Lewis) and about the projectibility of predicates in inductive inference generally (N. Goodman); (ii) thoughts about rule-following (L. Wittgenstein); (iii) an examination of some of J. R. Searle’s ideas…
Consuetudine: un’analisi concettuale
2014
In civil law systems, statutes and other legal texts sometimes refer to ‘custom’. In international law, it is undisputed that ‘custom’, alongside with treaties or conventions, is one of the main legal sources. The bulk of this paper is devoted to an attempt at answering a single, simple question: what is custom? What is it that statutes and other legal materials refer to, when they refer to ‘custom’? In answering this question the beginning of wisdom is to realize that there is no single, unique concept custom. ‘Custom’ designates different phenomena, which should be carefully distinguished. It is, then, possible to mould several concepts of custom, and customary rule. In the first, longer …
True Exceptions:Defeasibility and Particularism
2012
Sometimes, kinds of cases which do in fact fall under the antecedent of a conditional norm are reckoned recalcitrant. I.e., although they fall under the antecedent of the norm we do not wish to allow the consequence to follow. In such cases, we sometimes say that we are abandoning, or discarding, the norm. We concede, that is, that the alleged norm was wrong (or, if you wish, that it was no norm at all). At other times, however, it is claimed that the norm is a defeasible one. Granted, the case at hand is one of those in which the norm is defeated; but this, it is implied, does not amount to a wholesale abandonment of the norm itself. Being defeasible, the norm somehow survives the impact o…
Hart’s Blind Spot. Il tassello mancante in Th,e Concept of Law
2012
At the beginning of The Concept of Law Hart suggests a mistaken assimilation between conduct that is ‘non-optional’ and conduct that is ‘obligatory’ (i.e,. conduct that is either coerced or subject to an obligation). This suggested assimilation vitiates the argument of the whole book, leading Hart to neglect the different ways in which the law typically tracks, corroborates or constitutes power relations. It is true that, famously, attention is paid, in The Concept of Law, to normative, legal powers. Brute social power, and law’s relation to it—the role of law as a cog in the workings of social powers—, however, are largely overlooked. This is. in a way, Hart’s blind spot. I list some of th…
Emergencia y garantías (en el pensamiento jurídico de Luigi Ferrajoli)
2011
Abstract: Along with Spain and United Kingdom, Italy has suffered a terrible period of political violence between 1970 and 1982 with hundreds of killings. In this paper I analyse the origins of Luigi FERRAJOLI’s theory of legal guarantee and his criticisms to Italian legislation against terrorism of that time. Therefore, I shed light on three different understanding of such a theory and I offer a review of that legislation that he labelled as «the subsystem of exception ».Moreover I will apply this conception of «special» criminal law to two famous trials against militants of a group of the extreme left. According to FERRAJOLI, these trials have been an instance of the paradigm of political…
Legal Exclusionism: Legal Personhood Between the Erasure and the Rule of Law
La personalità giuridica è uno status giuridico che conferisce agli esseri umani (e ad alcune entità non-umane) la capacità di partecipare – in modo attivo e passivo – alla generalità delle relazioni giuridiche e la capacità di eseguire atti giuridici. Si tratta di uno status giuridico fondamentale, costitutivo del concetto stesso di diritto. Inoltre, si tratta di uno status limite, ovvero di uno status che distingue i soggetti del diritto dagli oggetti del diritto. Oggi la personalità giuridica è intesa come uno status quasi-naturale, attribuito ad ogni essere umano in maniera incondizionata e inalienabile. Oggi, inoltre, la privazione totale della personalità giuridica, come nel caso dell…
Il costituzionalismo contemporaneo ai tempi del Covid-19
2020
L’indeterminatezza è una delle caratteristiche salienti del diritto negli stati costituzionali contemporanei. Tale caratteristica mette in crisi le concezioni “oggettualistiche” del diritto che riducono il diritto a un insieme di norme o a un insieme di fatti e corrobora quelle concezioni che considerano il diritto una pratica sociale interpretativa. La costituzionalizzazione degli ordinamenti giuridici accresce la flessibilità del diritto a detrimento della certezza e impone a tutti – legislatori, giudici e individui soggetti al diritto – di assumersi le proprie responsabilità e i rischi che ne conseguono. Il modo in cui il legislatore, a diversi livelli, fronteggia l’attuale pandemia da C…
La botte piena e la moglie ubriaca, ovvero: i limiti del positivismo giuridico di Bruno Celano
2019
This paper proposes a critical analysis of Bruno Celano’s normative legal positivism. The main objections focuses on four crucial points of Celano’s theory: 1) the distinction between descriptive and normative jurisprudence, which is not taken in due account; 2) the underestimation of the role of interpretation in the legal domain; 3) the acritical acceptance of the source thesis; 4) the attempt of reconciling a procedural ideal of the Rule of Law with the substantial values of the contemporary constitutional States.
Farewell to the Rule of Recognition?
2011
Resumen:En este articulo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento, tal comofuera concebida por Hart, es o bien un concepto redundante —y en consecuenciainutil— o un concepto limitado en su poder explicativo. Encualquier caso, se trata de un concepto cuyo alcance es, frente a los sistemasjuridicos contemporaneos, mucho mas estrecho de lo que Hartpudo imaginar. De igual modo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento,en alguna de sus posibles (y plausibles) reformulaciones, puedetener a pesar de todo un papel significativo y no redundante, pero solamentesi se emplea en un sentido radicalmente distinto al que propusoHart o que se propone en buena parte de la literatura positivista posthart…