Search results for "RULE"
showing 10 items of 1403 documents
Rule of Law.Il governo della legge ieri e oggi
2011
In questa rivisitazione della formula del rule of law s’intende mostrare che essa non deve essere ridotta all’individuazione di determinate caratteristiche formali dei precetti giuridici e neppure allargata sì da comprendere determinati contenuti normativi del diritto, ma che essa è rivolta ad indicare come deve essere praticato il diritto. L’uso del diritto è importante quanto l’individuazione dei criteri formali di validità, e forse ancor più di questi. Questa linea di pensiero è illustrata sia facendo riferimento alla tradizione filosofico-giuridica, da Aristotele a Tommaso d’Aquino, sia segnalando l’espansione della formula del rule of law anche nella filosofia politica contemporanea, e…
POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO NORMATIVO, NEUTRALIDAD Y ESTADO DE DERECHO
2012
Usually, in jurisprudential debates what is discussed under the rubric of ‘neutrality’ is the claim that jurisprudence is (or at least can, and should be) a conceptual, or descriptive - thus, non-normative, or morally neutral - inquiry. I discuss neutrality in an altogether different sense, namely, neutrality as an ethico-political ideal the law should meet. My starting point is normative legal positivism, or the claim that it is a good and desirable thing that the laws have easily identifiable, readily accessible, as far as possible non-controversial social sources. What justifies normative legal positivism, I claim, is the value - or the ideal - of neutrality, suitably understood. I.e., w…
Rules and norms: two kinds of normative behaviour:
2016
Celano’s notion of a “pre-convention” is grounded in the opposition between two allegedly different kinds of normative behaviour: observing a “rule” and conforming to a “norm”. This opposition plays a central role in Celano’s paper, and marks a crucial point in his intellectual trajectory. Nevertheless, it remains largely implicit. In this paper, I try to make it fully explicit, giving a more precise characterisation of both kinds of normative behaviour. I also focus on the importance of distinguishing between them, express some conjectures (or wishes) regarding Celano’s future research, and propose a (marginal) criticism.
Hart’s blind spot. The missing piece in The Concept of Law
2014
Al inicio de El Concepto de Derecho, Hart sugiere una asimilación errónea entre conducta que es «no opcional» y conducta que es «obligatoria» (i. e. conducta que o es forzada o sometida a una obligación). Esta asimilación vicia el argumento del libro en su conjunto, llevándole a Hart a descuidar las diferentes vías en las que el derecho monitorea, corrobora o constituye relaciones de poder. Es cierto y evidente que en The Concept of Law la atención se dedica a los poderes normativos, legales. Sin embargo, el poder social bruto, y las relaciones del derecho con él —el papel del derecho como una pieza en la maquinaria de los poderes sociales— están ampliamente ignorados. Éste es, de alguna ma…
Rule of Recognition, Convention and Obligation. What Shapiro Can Still Learn From Hart’s Mistakes
2012
Shapiro works out a version of legal positivism, taking as its starting point Hart’s practice theory of law. Some serious limits of Hart’s practice theory of norms concern the conception of legal obligation and normativity of law. In this chapter, I analyze the limits of Hart’s conception of legal normativity and I appraise whether the planning theory of law indicates the correct direction for overcoming them. To anticipate the conclusion, my effort is to show that Shapiro replicates Hart’s mistakes on these subject matters. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I will present briefly a critical reconstruction of Hart’s conception of normativity, a reconstruction which is…
Publicidad y Rule of Law
2011
By the ‘Rule of Law’ I mean a set of formal and institutional features the law may possess in varying degrees. These features define an ideal, which laws have traditionally been expected to live up to. One of these features is publicity. Part of what constitutes the Rule of Law is the requirement that the laws should be public. This is the subject of this paper. When it is claimed that the Rule of Law requires that the laws should be public, what is to be understood by this claim? My main claim is that the Rule of Law requirement of publicity is best understood in terms of the notion of common, or mutual, knowledge. When it is required that the laws should be public, what should be meant by…
Multiculturalismo liberale, neutralità e Rule of Law
2011
Most contemporary liberal theories of justice agree that principles of justice should be neutral between citizens’ conceptions of the good life. In this essay, I assume that the liberal doctrine of state neutrality can somehow be defended against its critics. y first aim is to show that a certain connection holds between liberal neutrality, suitably understood, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Rule of Law. By the ‘Rule of Law’ I mean, as has now become usual among legal theorists, a set of formal and institutional features the law may possess in varying degrees. These features define an ideal, which laws have traditionally been expected to live up to. It is, under many respects,…
Liberal Multiculturalism, neutrality and the Rule of Law
2011
Most contemporary liberal theories of justice agree that principles of justice should be neutral between citizens’ conceptions of the good life. In this essay, I assume that the liberal doctrine of state neutrality can somehow be defended against its critics. y first aim is to show that a certain connection holds between liberal neutrality, suitably understood, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Rule of Law. By the ‘Rule of Law’ I mean, as has now become usual among legal theorists, a set of formal and institutional features the law may possess in varying degrees. These features define an ideal, which laws have traditionally been expected to live up to. It is, under many respects,…
Law as Power: Two Rule of Law Requirements
2013
Abstract. ‘Law as power’ is a neglected topic in contemporary analytical jurisprudence. Attention has been paid, from Hart (and Kelsen) onwards, to normative powers. ‘Brute’ social power, however, and law’s relation to it, are, in post-Hartian jurisprudence, largely overlooked. The subject of this paper is the shape social power takes when the rule of the law is envisaged as an ethico-political ideal—I discuss, that is, the Rule of Law as a specific mode of the exercise of social power, and what is valuable in it. I concentrate on two Rule of Law requirements, consistency (i.e., the avoidance of conflicts) and compliability (i.e., conformity to the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle). They con…
Il Rule of Law e il pluralismo giuridico contemporaneo
2008
Si esamina l'evoluzione del rule of law alla luce del diritto costituzionale, internazionale e transnazionale contemporaneo