Search results for "Storia della filosofia"
showing 10 items of 438 documents
Aldo Capitini. Una filosofia per la vita
2014
Il volume prende in esame gli articoli che Aldo Capitini pubblicò dal 1964 al 1968 nella rivista «Azione nonviolenta». Attraverso l’analisi e la lettura degli articoli che Capitini scrisse negli ultimi anni della sua vita si deduce una particolare concezione della filosofia incentrata sui principi di valore e di libertà.
La preistoria del soggetto
2011
Analisi della relazione tra sostanza e soggetto in Cartesio
Abstract. Towards a Theory of Cognitive Responsibility: Action, Perception and Normativity from Plato to Searle.
2011
The talk articulates the normative commitments allowing us to consider perceptual experience as a form of knowledge - that is, as a form of the human activity situated in the normative space of reason of which we can be held responsible. More specifically, John Searle's characterization of the logical structure of perceptual experiences as causally selfreferential intentional states can be developed into an account of the causal and normative-intentional aspects of experience, the genealogy of which can be traced back to Plato's Theaetetus and Meno. In these dialogues, in fact, a picture of experience as "knowledge" seems to be based on a specific "reasoning about the cause" as the specific…
ENSO IV - Book of Abstracts
2015
The conference addresses questions about the formation, persistence, change and collapse of social-institutional reality; the nature of collective intentionality; the ontogenesis of the capacity for interaction; team reasoning and distributed cognition; collective decision-making; collective responsibility; political power and social change; the role of language in the construction of social and institutional reality; institutional and social normativity; group membership and group identity; the logical and normative structure of cooperation; the psychological and conceptual mechanisms underlying the emergence of social interaction and collective agency; the nature of duties and rights buil…
Intenzionalità collettiva, ontologia sociale e mindreading
2014
In his Collective Intentions and Actions John Searle argued that having a preintentional sense of others as at least potentially cooperative agents “like me” is a necessary condition of collective intentionality. He also argued, in Rationality in Action, that understanding others qua intentional agents necessarily presupposes rationality because rational constraints are built into the logical structure of intentional phenomena. In this paper we will try to specify further these claims in the light of current debate on mindreading, where other-understanding is spelled out either in terms of automatic, subpersonal simulative mechanisms, or in terms of normative, rational principles. We will a…
Collective Intentionality, Language, and Normativity: A Problem and a Possible Solution for the Analysis of Cooperation
2015
In this paper I discuss Searle's analysis of social ontology in the light of his account of the sources of normativity as rooted in the logical structure of language. I conclude that, though his theory of normativity may appear to be inconsistent with his theory collective intentionality, it is really our Background sense of the other that creates a sense of community even before the actual functioning of collective intentionality and language, thereby escaping the dilemma between individualism and collectivism.
Sources and Boundaries of Institutional and Linguistic Normativity. Towards a Critical Social Ontology.
2013
Since Hegel and until speech acts theory and contemporary social ontology it came to full development the idea that most of reasons, duties, rights, entitlements, have to do, against Kant, with our participation to social, linguistic and institutional practices of the lifeform to which we belong rather than or more than with our dealing with “substantive moral principles”. But if we accept, with Hegel, that every individual rational determination of the will is justified as such only as a part of our collective Sittlichkheit (Hegel, 1967, cf. Di Lorenzo Ajello, 2009); if we accept from speech acts theory that there are commitments, rights and entitlements specific to every type of speech ac…
Il collettivo secondo Margaret Gilbert: impegno congiunto ed soggetto plurale
2019
Quando possiamo considerare un insieme di individui un collettivo, un gruppo sociale? E' questa la domanda attorno a cui converge la riflessione che condurrò nelle pagine seguenti sul rapporto tra individui e collettività nel processo di formazione di quest'ultima. Oggi discutere di individuo e collettività significa discutere di ontologia sociale: quella branca della filosofia che si è sviluppata dagli anni '80 del secolo scorso fino ai giorni nostri e che si occupa di analizzare la realtà il cui artefice è l'uomo e che viene chiamata realtà sociale, poiché ha bisogno, almeno all'inizio, di un riconoscimento collettivo da parte di un gruppo più o meno ampio di soggetti. Dunque, come ci spi…
L'attaccamento ai luoghi come modello interpretativo delle relazioni dell'uomo con la cultura. Una ricerca su un campione di ragazzi tunisini della c…
2014
L'attaccamento al luogo è un essenziale bisogno umano in grado di nutrire il senso dell'identità di individui e collettività, a prescindere dai cambiamenti della società. Intento principale in questo lavoro di tesi è quello dell'integrazione, legato al fenomeno dell' intercultura. Il lavoro di tesi è riferito nello specifico nella città di Mazara del Vallo, centro nevralgico di incontro di culture. Ho scelto di indagare la percezione del luogo da parte della popolazione immigrata, coinvolgendo in particolare gli adolescenti che costituiscono la cosiddetta "seconda generazione", e confrontandone le opinioni con quelle espresse dai coetanei autoctoni. L'aspetto più propriamente statistico rig…
La comprensione dell’altro tra spiegazioni mentalistiche e pratiche situate
2014
This essay presents current criticisms against a “mentalistic” interpretation of the practice of understanding others as providing some reasons for a redefinition of the structure of the problem rather than for its deconstruction. More specifically, I hypothesize that the problem of reconciling the practical status of our understanding with the reflective stance needed to understand and assess apparently “out of context” behavior is a legitimate one, and that the analysis of the normative structure of cooperative interaction provided by John Searle and Paul Grice can provide us with the tools to deal with this problem.