Search results for "TrustZone"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
Nanovised Control Flow Attestation
2022
This paper presents an improvement of control flow attestation (C-FLAT) for Linux. C-FLAT is a control attestation system for embedded devices. It was implemented as a software executing in ARM’s TrustZone on bare-metal devices. We extend the design and implementation of C-FLAT through the use of a type 2 Nanovisor in the Linux operating system. We call our improved system “C-FLAT Linux”. Compared to the original C-FLAT, C-FLAT Linux reduces processing overheads and is able to detect the SlowLoris attack. We describe the architecture of C-FLAT Linux and provide extensive measurements of its performance in benchmarks and real-world scenarios. In addition, we demonstrate the…
Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection
2021
AbstractARM TrustZone offers a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) embedded into the processor cores. Some vendors offer ARM modules that do not fully comply with TrustZone specifications, which may lead to vulnerabilities in the system. In this paper, we present a DMA attack tutorial from the insecure world onto the secure world, and the design and implementation of this attack in a real insecure hardware.
Arm security alternatives
2019
Many real-world scenarios such as protecting DRM, online payments and usage in NFC payments in embedded devices require a trustworthy “trusted execution environment” (TEE) platform. The TEE should run on the ARM architecture. That is popular in embedded devices. Furthermore, past experience has proved that such TEE platform should be available in source code form. Without the source code 3rd parties and user cannot be conducted code review audit. Lack of review put doubt on the system as a trustworthy environment. The popular Android OS supports various TEE implementations. Each TEE OS implementation has its own unique way of deploying trusted applications(trustlets) and its own distinct fe…