Search results for "antitrust"

More firms, more competition? The case of the fourth operator in France's mobile phone market

2010

Accepted, Forthcoming; International audience; To foster competition the French government authorized a fourth operator, ‘Free', to enter the country's mobile phone market at the end of 2009 alongside Orange, SFR and Bouygues Telecom (BT), who held respectively one-half, one-third and one-sixth of the market. By using a stylized model of France's phone market, we have examined what we call the regulator's nightmares and dreams. If Cournot competition is in place before Free's entry, minimizing the total profit fails to maximize the consumer surplus and the total surplus; the maximum most realistic price fall is 6.7% compared to three-way competition and could be 1.7% only; if Orange, SFR an…

The path to privatization of EU antitrust enforcement: a critical estimate

2011

Cartels Uncovered

2018

How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the efficiency of competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that answers the question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel exists in an industry or not. Our model identifies key policy parameters from data generated under different competition policy regimes and may be used with time-series or panel data. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels - Finnish manufacturing industries 1951 - 1990. Our estimates suggest that by the end of the period, almost all industries were cartelized.

LA QUESTIONE RELATIVA ALLA COMPATIBILITA’ DELLA NORMATIVA ITALIANA IN MATERIA DI GIOCO D’AZZARDO E SCOMMESSE SPORTIVE CON IL DIRITTO COMUNITARIO ANTI…

2013

L'applicazione delle regole di concorrenza nel mercato globale-locale: istanze di tutela, sfide ed opportunità

2015

La globalizzazione pone dal punto di vista antitrust nuove sfide, legate alla necessità di individuare le regole giuridiche e gli strumenti per intervenire in mercati i cui confini trascendono non solo la dimensione nazionale, ma addirittura quella europea. In questi contesti il controllo esercitato dalle singole autorità nazionali diventa, infatti, sempre più complicato e, per certi aspetti marginale, mentre quello realizzato all’interno della rete europea richiede alcuni aggiustamenti, necessari a incidere efficacemente sulle condotte tenute nell’arena globale

The cjeu judgment in the huawei/zte case: getting around the problem of frand commitments and competition law

2017

Con la pronuncia pregiudiziale sul caso Huawei, la Corte di giustizia è intervenuta per la prima volta sul conflitto tra titolari di brevetti essenziali per l’implementazione di uno standard e richiedenti licenze su tali brevetti, in un contesto caratterizzato dall’esistenza di impegni FRAND. Sebbene la questione attenga all’applicazione dell’art. 102 del TFUE, la Corte ha eluso la fondamentale questione della sussistenza dei presupposti per tale applicazione. Inoltre, nessun contributo la pronuncia reca alla individuazione di criteri per la determinazione degli impegni FRAND. La Corte ha invece aderito all’approccio metodologico affermatosi nella giurisprudenza tedesca, pur non condividend…

I programmi di clemenza nel diritto antitrust italiano

2007

Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?

2009

International audience; France Telecom (FT), SFR and Bouygues Telecom (BT) have been fined by France's Conseil de la Concurrence (CC) for organizing a mobile phone cartel with stable market shares (one-half, one-third and one-sixth, respectively) and for directly exchanging commercial information. While not contesting the legal decision, it is argued here that the economic reasoning is flawed. (1) As the CC made much of the firms' stable market shares, we have first followed this line of reasoning by considering that the market shares are quotas under uniform costs. Even if there is a general incentive to form a monopolistic cartel, BT was too small for it to be worth its while to join it; it i…

INTERDIPENDENZA OLIGOPOLISTICA E AZIONE CONCERTATA NEL DIRITTO ANTITRUST

2012

John Bates Clark on trusts: New light from the Columbia archives

2005

Public concern over the so called “trust problem” in the United States between the end of the nineteenth century and 1914, the year of the passage of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Acts, was reflected in the considerable contemporary literature on the subject. Not surprisingly, professional economists actively participated in this debate. Their thinking directly and indirectly influenced the legislation of 1914 in a way that cannot be said of the Sherman Act of 1890 (Mayhew 1998). A survey of the most important of these professional writings shows that, among the several voices animating the discussion, John Bates Clark's was perhaps the most influential. In this connection,…