Search results for "ddc:100"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
Moral Attitudes Toward Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement (PCE): Differences and Similarities Among Germans With and Without PCE Experience
2018
Pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE), the use of illicit and/or prescription drugs to increase cognitive performance, has spurred controversial discussion in bioethics. In a semi-structured interview study with 60 German university students and employees, differences and similarities in moral attitudes toward PCE among 30 experienced participants (EPs) vs. 30 inexperienced participants (IPs) were investigated. Substances EPs used most often are methylphenidate, amphetamines, tetrahydrocannabinol and modafinil. Both EPs and IPs addressed topics such as autonomous decision making or issues related to fairness such as equality in test evaluation and distortion of competition. While most…
Anerkjennelse og menneskeverdets forankring : henimot en transnasjonal anerkjennelsespolitikk
2011
Anerkjennelse spiller en nøkkelrolle for menneskeverdet innenfor Frankfurterskolens kritiske teori. Men hvorledes skal «anerkjennelse» forstås? Og hvorledes kan anerkjennelse innløse menneskeverdets universelle og egalitære fordring? Jürgen Habermas' og Axel Honneths «familiekrangel» bidrar med relevant innsikt om relasjonen mellom menneskeverd og anerkjennelse. Dette er en innsikt med affinitet til menneskeverdets normative legitimering i dagens transnasjonaliserte verden.Nøkkelord: Menneskeverd, transnasjonal anerkjennelsespolitikk, Jürgen Habermas, Axel HonnethEnglish summary: Recognition and the Grounding of Human Dignity – Towards a Transnational Politics of RecognitionRecognition play…
The embodied self, the pattern theory of self, and the predictive mind
2018
Do we have to presuppose a self to account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should we characterize the self? These questions are discussed in the context of two alternatives, i.e., the no-self position held by \(\textit {Metzinger (2003, 2009)}\) and the claim that the only self we have to presuppose is a narrative self \(\textit {(Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 2007; Hardcastle, 2008)}\) which is primarily an abstract entity. In contrast to these theories, I argue that we have to presuppose an embodied self, although this is not a metaphysical substance, nor an entity for which stable necessary and jointly sufficient conditions can be given. Self-consciousness results from an integrati…