Search results for "deterrence"
showing 10 items of 26 documents
Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence
2018
This paper deals with the presumption of innocence and the law enforcer's incentives to exert investigative effort. Our main result is that, even if the presumption of guilt maximizes deterrence for a given effort by the law enforcer, divergent objectives between the law enforcer (who maximizes the probability of a conviction weighted by the magnitude of the sanction and the type of the citizen) and the public decision-maker (who minimizes social costs) may lead the latter to prefer the presumption of innocence. Indeed, the presumption of innocence may induce the law enforcer to increase investigative efforts thereby improving deterrence. As a consequence, if the law enforcer's effort is re…
Organised Crime and the Economy: a Framework for Policy Prescriptions
2014
In this paper we discuss policies to combat organised crime from the perspective of economic analysis. We introduce concepts such as supply and demand for Mafia and the implied notion of equilibrium to build a framework to classify the contexts in which organised crime interferes with the economy. We then use this framework to discuss policy interventions, distinguishing between policies implemented by the State and mobilisation of civil society. We show that using the economic approach helps understand the aspect of persistence of criminal organisations and identify vicious circles of different nature. The broad spectrum of State policies identified includes norms on competition, on the ef…
The Modern Strategies in the Cyber Warfare
2018
As there is no generally accepted definition for cyber warfare, it is a term that is quite liberally used in describing events and actions in the digital cyber world. The concept of cyber warfare became extremely popular from 2008 to 2010, partly superseding the previously used concept of information warfare which was launched in the 1990s. For some, cyber warfare is war that is conducted in the virtual domain. For others, it is a counterpart to conventional “kinetic” warfare. According to the OECD’s 2001 report, cyberwar military doctrines resemble those of so-called conventional war: retaliation and deterrence. Researchers agree with the notion that the definition of cyberwar should addre…
The UN in the Lab
2013
We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Deterrence and Prevention. Deterrence – investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack – generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists, while Prevention – investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack – creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coor…
Geographical distribution of crime in Italian provinces: a spatial econometric analysis
2009
For a long time social sciences scholars from different fields have devoted their attention to identifying the causes leading to commit criminal offences and recently lots of studies have included the analysis of spatial effects. Respect to the Italian crime phenomenon some stylized facts exist: high spatial and time variability and presence of “organised crime” (e.g. Mafia and Camorra) deep-seated in some local territorial areas. Using explanatory spatial data analysis, the paper firstly explores the spatial structure and distribution of four different typologies of crimes (murders, thefts, frauds, and squeezes) in Italian provinces in two years, 1999 and 2003. ESDA allows us to detect som…
Entry and espionage with noisy signals
2014
Abstract We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off…
IS Security Policy Violations
2012
Employee violations of IS security policies are reported as a key concern for organizations. Although behavioral research on IS security has received increasing attention from IS scholars, little empirical research has examined this problem. To address this research gap, the authors test a model based on Rational Choice Theory RCT-a prominent criminological theory not yet applied in IS-which explains, in terms of a utilitarian calculation, an individual's decision to commit a violation. Empirical results show that the effects of informal sanctions, moral beliefs, and perceived benefits convincingly explain employee IS security policy violations, while the effect of formal sanctions is insig…
Effects of sanctions, moral beliefs, and neutralization on information security policy violations across cultures
2020
Abstract A principal concern of organizations is the failure of employees to comply with information security policies (ISPs). Deterrence theory is one of the most frequently used theories for examining ISP violations, yet studies using this theory have produced mixed results. Past research has indicated that cultural differences may be one reason for these inconsistent findings and have hence called for cross-cultural research on deterrence in information security. To address this gap, we formulated a model including deterrence, moral beliefs, shame, and neutralization techniques and tested it with the employees from 48 countries working for a large multinational company.
Carry a big stick, or no stick at all: Punishment and endowment heterogeneity in the trust game
2016
AbstractWe investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, re…
Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error
2020
We study the interactions between accuracy and standards used in the determination of legal liability. First, we show that accuracy and type-1 errors (wrongful findings of liability) must reduce each other's effectiveness in mitigating optimal type-2 errors (wrongful failures to assign liability) for previous results in the literature to hold. When this condition holds, for major crimes the median voter's tolerance for type-1 errors is reduced as the legal system's accuracy increases. However, this relationship need not hold for minor offenses. Our analysis also reveals that legal processes that emerge under electoral pressures convict more often than is optimal but less often than necessar…